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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies three economic problems plagued by multiple equilibria. 
Indeterminacy of equilibrium outcome often poses a challenge in deriving robust pre-
dictions and policy guidance. The dissertation shows how the utilization of potential 
game theory can better deal with this challenge.
Chapter 1 studies a general contracting problem between one principal and multi-
ple agents. The interdependence of agents’ actions and payoffs creates a coordination 
problem among them, leading to multiple equilibria. In general, the principal’s opti-
mal contracting scheme varies with how one selects among equilibria. Nevertheless, 
for a large class of contracting models where agents’ payoffs constitute a weighted 
potential game, I show that one contracting scheme is optimal for a large class of 
equilibrium selection criteria. This scheme ranks agents in increasing weight in the 
weighted potential game and induces them to accept their offers in a dominance-
solvable way, starting from the first agent. I also apply the general results to networks 
and pure/impure public goods/bads.
Chapter 2 studies two-sided markets, where two groups of agents interact via 
platforms. These markets exhibit network effects, i.e., the value of joining a platform 
increases with the number of users, which in turn lead to multiple equilibria. I show 
that many two-sided market models are weighted potential games, enabling the selec-
v
tion among equilibria by potential maximization—a refinement of Nash equilibrium
justified by many theoretical and experimental studies. Under potential maximiza-
tion, platforms often charge the side deriving more network benefits and subsidize
the other side. Therefore, profit-maximizing platforms are often designed to favor the
money side much more than the subsidy side.
Chapter 3 studies markets with strong network effects. In these markets, firms
compete for the adoption of all consumers rather than the marginal consumer. There-
fore, the Spence distortion—a quality distortion driven by competition for the marginal
consumer—should be absent, contradicting the findings in the network economics lit-
erature. This inconsistency stems from the choice of equilibrium selection criterion.
I show that all popular selection criteria in that literature lead to Spence distortions,
whereas potential maximization does not. Therefore, network market regulations
based on Spence distortion arguments may be misguided.
vi
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Many contracting situations involve multiple agents, and in most of these situations, an
agents payo¤ depends on other agentsactions. For example, the value of joining a plat-
form increases with the number of users; the return from an investment is a¤ected by
others investment decisions; the incentive to work changes with co-workers e¤orts. A
natural question arises: how does the principals optimal contracting scheme take into
account these (potentially very complex) interactions among agents? Moreover, agents
strategic interactions often generate multiple equilibria. All the above examples may have
(at least) a high- and a low-participation/investment/e¤ort equilibrium. The principals
payo¤ typically di¤ers across equilibria. This raises a more fundamental problem: how
should we dene the optimality of a contracting scheme when there are multiple equilib-
ria? Ultimately, what contracts should the principal o¤er when there are multiple agents?
The most common approach to deal with the fundamental problem is to specify an
equilibrium selection criterion (or, more generally, an implementation requirement)1 and
get rid of multiple equilibria. However, this approach does not fully resolve the problem
because it replaces the issue of multiple equilibria with the issue of multiple equilibrium
selection criteria. To illustrate, the optimal contracts for the best-case scenario are likely
rejected by agents in less favorable scenarios. On the other hand, the optimal contracts for
1As I will formally show on p. 10, any equilibrium selection criterion can be expressed as an implemen-
tation requirement, but not vice versa. For example, the best (worst) equilibrium selection criterion for the
principal is equivalent to partial (robust) implementation, but any requirement stronger than robust imple-
mentation (e.g., unique, dominance-solvable, or dominant-strategy implementation) is not an equilibrium
selection criterion.
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the worst-case scenario likely forgo huge prots in more favorable scenarios. If the principal
(or we, as researchers) does not know the underlying equilibrium selection criterion, can
we still recommend (or reasonably predict) what contracts the principal should (or would)
o¤er?
This paper shows that the answer to the above question is yes for a large class of
contracting models with complete information. The timing is standard: the principal o¤ers
each agent a menu of publicly observable bilateral2 contracts in stage 1, and each agent
simultaneously chooses a contract (or rejects all contracts) in stage 2. Each agents set
of possible actions can be any compact set. Regarding their interactions, some agents
actions can be strategic complements while some others can be strategic substitutes. The
principal can be self-interested or benevolent. The only key assumption, which is a technical
assumption, is that agents payo¤s constitute a weighted potential game. The solution
concept is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with an equilibrium selection criterion. One
equilibrium selection criterion is said to be more pessimistic than the other if, in every
stage-2 subgame, the selected equilibrium gives the principal a weakly lower payo¤. As
a technical tool, an equilibrium selection criterion, potential maximization, plays a crucial
role in the analysis.
The main result of this paper is that under any equilibrium selection criterion that is
more pessimistic than potential maximization, the principals optimal contracting scheme
is to o¤er weight-ranked divide-and-conquer (w-DC) contracts. The w-DC contracts rank
agents in increasing order of their weights in the weighted potential game and o¤er each
agent one3 contract asking him to take a specied action. The associated contract prices
or subsidies are set in a way that the rst agent has a weakly dominant strategy to accept
the o¤er; given the rst agent accepts the o¤er, the second agent has an (iterated) weakly
2As pointed out by the literature (e.g., Bernstein and Winter 2012; Halac et al. 2020), the principal can
only rely on bilateral contracts in many real-world contracting situations. If the principal is allowed to o¤er
multilateral contracts (i.e., contracts that can condition on othersactions), she can easily induce a unique
equilibrium that fully extracts all agentssurplus in most such models.
3Note that the principal can o¤er each agent a menu of contracts, but it turns out she only needs to
o¤er one contract to each agent in this optimal contracting scheme.
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dominant strategy to accept the o¤er as well, and so on. Thus, the w-DC contracts
induce all agents to accept their o¤ers as a dominance-solvable equilibrium in a particular
order. In addition, I show that the w-DC contracts may be suboptimal if the underlying
equilibrium selection criterion is not more pessimistic than potential maximization. Hence,
I have identied the complete set of equilibrium selection criteria for which the principal
always o¤ers the w-DC contracts. I further extend the main result by showing that the w-
DC contracts are optimal for a large class of implementation requirements, which includes
robust, unique, and dominance-solvable implementation.
Section 1.4 of this paper applies the general results to three special cases: networks,
public goods/bads (henceforth goods for simplicity), and impure public goods. In the
undirected network model, agents can be heterogeneous in many aspects, including their
(i) sets of connected agents, (ii) valuations of network benets, and (iii) importance to
their connected agents regarding network benets. The w-DC contracts rank agents in
increasing valuation-to-importance ratio. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in the
economics of networks literature (see, e.g., Section 7 of Jackson et al. 2017 for a survey)
that the principal should o¤er more favorable contracts to agents with high centrality
(i.e., at central positions in the network), the network structure plays no role in agents
ranking.4 I further derive a natural network formation process and show that under this
process, highly connected agents are those with high valuations and those with either high
or low importance.
In the public good model, agents can be heterogeneous in many aspects, including their
(i) valuations of the public good and (ii) importance of their contributions to the public
good. In contrast to the network model, the w-DC contracts rank agents in increasing
valuation regardless of their importance. As the impure public good model claries, the
reason for these opposing results is that the public good is non-excludable whereas the
network goodis excludable. In that model, the w-DC contracts always prioritize agents
4As I will explain more on p. 15, higher-ranked agents receive better prices. In particular, the rst agent
has a dominant strategy to accept the o¤er, whereas the last agent is indi¤erent between accepting and
rejecting the o¤er in equilibrium.
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with low valuations; they also prioritize those with high importance if and only if the good
is su¢ ciently excludable.
This paper makes two general contributions. First, it extends our understanding of
multi-agent contracting. Various contracting schemes are derived under di¤erent imple-
mentation requirements in the literature. For example, the seminal papers by Segal (1999,
2003) study the same model and derive very di¤erent contracting schemes under partial and
unique implementation respectively. This paper shows that one contracting scheme the
w-DC contracts is particularly robust because it is optimal for a large class of equilib-
rium selection criteria and implementation requirements. This result helps us make better
predictions and policy advice on multi-agent contracting problems especially when we, as
researchers, do not know the underlying equilibrium selection criterion or what implemen-
tation requirement the principal aims to meet.
In the literature, specic divide-and-conquer (DC) contracts are derived (e.g., Segal
2003; Winter 2004; Bernstein and Winter 2012; Halac et al. 2020) under (i) binary/one-
dimensional actions for agents, (ii) strategic complementarities among all agents, and (iii)
the requirement of unique implementation. This paper uncovers the generality and robust-
ness of the DC contracts by relaxing all three restrictions substantially and deriving the
general form of the DC contracts. Furthermore, this paper is the rst to derive the optimal
ranking for the DC contracts in a general setting and, thus, fully characterize the optimal
contracting scheme: the w-DC contracts.
Second, the paper advances the analysis of multi-agent contracting problems. Although
its primary focus is the w-DC contracts, the general framework and tools developed are
applicable to all such problems. In particular, the novel interaction structure among agents,
which is derived from two binary relations, is considerably more exible than the usual
strategic complementarity/substitutability structure, enabling us to study a wider range
of contracting situations. In addition, a methodological contribution of this paper is to
incorporate potential game theory into multi-agent contracting. The concept of potential
games was introduced by Rosenthal (1973) and formalized by Monderer and Shapley (1996).
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Potential maximization renes Nash equilibrium in (weighted) potential games.5 I will
explain both concepts in Section 1.2. As Section 1.4 reveals, agentspayo¤s constitute a
weighted potential game in many contracting models. By exploiting this useful property,
one may be able to derive stronger results as this paper does.
Beyond the above general contributions, Section 1.4 contributes to the literature on the
economics of networks, public goods, and impure public goods.6 One contribution common
to all three strands of literature is to show the optimality and robustness of the correspond-
ing w-DC contracts in each of the environments. A paper related to all three applications
is Sakovics and Steiner (2012). They analyze a binary-action complete network under
global-game selection (which is equivalent to potential maximization; see footnote 5) and
show that the principal ranks agents in increasing valuation-to-importance ratio and then
o¤ers divide-and-conquer contracts. My network model uncovers the robustness of their
main nding to (i) more general actions, (ii) arbitrary undirected network structures, and
(iii) all equilibrium selection criteria more pessimistic than global-game selection. How-
ever, my (impure) public good model reveals that their nding is not robust to (partially)
non-excludable externalities. Hence, my results urge caution in applying their nding to
their leading applications economic development and nancial fragility which are largely
public goods/bads in nature or at least partially non-excludable. My impure public good
model provides rened guidance on vertical/sectoral industrial policies (a.k.a. picking
winners) for the former and nancial policies for the latter.
5Although inconsequential to my main result, this renement is justied by many theoretical and ex-
perimental studies; see Chan (2019, Related Literature) for a summary of established justications. In
particular, it coincides with global-game selection in supermodular weighted potential games (Frankel at
el. 2003) and risk dominance in two-agent two-action games.
6For the recently growing literature on contracting in networks, see, for example, Belhaj and Deroian
(2019), Jadbabaie and Kakhbod (2019), Bloch and Shabayek (2020), Shi and Xing (2020), and Zhang and
Chen (2020). See Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Cornes and Sandler (1984, 1994) for the seminal works on
public goods and impure public goods respectively.
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1.2 Model
A principal (she) contracts with N agents (he). With a slight abuse of notation, let
N  f1; : : : ; Ng also denote the set of agents. Let xi 2 Xi denote the action of agent
i 2 N , where Xi can be any compact set with oi 2 Xi denoting the outside option of
rejecting the principals o¤ers. Let x 2 X 
Q
iXi denote agents action prole, and
x i 2 X i 
Q
j 6=iXj and x ij 2 X ij 
Q
k=2fi;jgXk are dened in the usual way. The
game has two stages. In stage 1, the principal sets a price function pi 2 Pi  fpi :
Xi ! Rjpi(oi) = 0g for each agent i. This is equivalent to o¤ering each agent a menu of
bilateral contracts (xi; pi(xi)) given that she can always prevent an agent from taking a
certain action xi 2 Xinfoig by charging an arbitrarily high price pi(xi) for that action. Let
p 2 P 
Q
i Pi denote the menu prole o¤ered to agents. In stage 2, all agents observe p
and simultaneously choose from (Xi), i.e., mixed strategies are allowed.7 Each agent is
payo¤ is linear in money, i.e., ui(x)   pi(xi), where the continuous function ui : X ! R
measures his intrinsic utility. The principals payo¤ is U(x;
P
i pi(xi)), where the upper
semicontinuous function U : XR! R is weakly increasing in her total revenue
P
i pi(xi).
The function U is su¢ ciently general to represent a self-interested (e.g., U =
P
i pi(xi)) or
benevolent (e.g., U =
P
i ui(x)) principal. All players are expected utility maximizers.
The results in Section 1.3 hold for all agents(intrinsic) utilities u  (ui)i satisfying
the following three assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Weighted potential game) There exists a (weight) vectorw  (wi)i 2
RN++ and a (potential) function  : X ! R such that for all i 2 N ,
ui(xi;x i)  ui(x0i;x i) = wi[(xi;x i)  (x0i;x i)] for all xi; x0i 2 Xi and x i 2 X i:
(1.1)
Assumption 1 (henceforth A1; similarly for A2 and A3) states that agentsutilities u
7Most of this literature does not consider mixed strategies, but this is with loss of generality. For
example, in a subgame, a mixed-strategy equilibrium may be the unique equilibrium giving the principal
the highest expected payo¤. Therefore, if the principal can select her most preferred equilibrium as in Segal
(1999), she will select the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
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constitute a weighted potential game. Verbally, there exists a real-valued function  dened
on the set of action proles such that the change in any agents utility by unilaterally
switching actions is proportional (with proportion wi for agent i) to the corresponding
change in . Thus,  summarizes all agentsstrategic considerations. Observe that (1.1)
holds if and only if there exists a (pure externality) function i : X i ! R such that
ui(x) = wi(x) + i(x i) for all x 2 X:8 (1.2)
Many contracting models satisfy A1. For example, let Xi be any compact subset of R+
with oi = 0 2 Xi (e.g., Xi = f0; 1g or Xi = [0; xi]) and ui take the following form:




where bi : Xi ! R measures his stand-alone benet/cost, Ei  Nnfig is the set of agents
interacting with agent i (interactions are two-way, i.e., j 2 Ei i¤ i 2 Ej), vi 2 R++
measures his valuation of interaction benets, and j 2 R++ measures the relative impor-
tance of agent js actions to his interacting agents. Agents can di¤er in ve dimensions
(Xi; bi; Ei; vi; i) in this general example, which in turn covers a wide variety of contracting
situations. Section 1.4.1 analyzes this example and (Lemma 4) shows that it satises A1
(and A2 and A3). Sections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 study two other examples that also satisfy
A1A3.
In order to state the other two assumptions on agentsutilities u, I rst dene two
binary relations C and S between any two distinct agentsaction sets Xj and Xi.
Denition 1 The expression xjCxi (xjSxi) stands for
ui(xi; xj ;x ij)  ui(oi; xj ;x ij)  () ui(xi; oj ;x ij)  ui(oi; oj ;x ij) 8x ij 2 X ij :
(1.4)
In words, xjCxi (xjSxi) means xj always strategically complements (substitutes) xi
8The if part is trivial. For the only if part, the function i(x i)  ui(x)   wi(x) is well dened
because, by (1.1), ui(xi;x i)  wi(xi;x i) = ui(x0i;x i)  wi(x0i;x i) for all xi; x0i 2 Xi.
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relative to the outside option. The second assumption is stated as follows.
Assumption 2 (Sign independence of othersactions) For each x 2 X and distinct
i; j 2 N , xjCxi or xjSxi.
To better understand A2, consider a scenario in which agents i and j only choose
between a particular action (say, xi for i and xj for j) and the outside option, and all
other agents choose the outside option. In this scenario, xj either strategically comple-
ments or substitutes xi because ui(xi; xj ;o ij)   ui(oi; xj ;o ij) is either greater or less
than ui(xi; oj ;o ij) ui(oi; oj ;o ij). A2 implies that if xj strategically complements (sub-
stitutes) xi in this scenario, then xj always strategically complements (substitutes) xi
regardless of othersactions x ij .
Observe from (1.1) and (1.4) that A1 implies C and S are symmetric, i.e., xjCxi (xjSxi)
if and only if xiCxj (xiSxj).9 In other words, any two agentsactions either strategically
complement or substitute each other relative to the outside option. I write xj Cxi if xjCxi
but not xjSxi. Clearly, C is also symmetric. The last assumption is stated as follows.
Assumption 3 (Weak transitivity for C) For each x 2 X and distinct i1; i2; : : : ; in 2
N (n  N), if xi1 Cxi2 C    Cxin then xi1Cxin .
Observe that A3 is weaker than assuming C ( C) is transitive, which replaces all C (C)
in A3 with C ( C). A2 and A3 are rather weak. They are vacuous if there are only two
agents. For more agents, they impose no restrictions on any two actions xi; x0i 2 Xinfoig
from the same agent. In particular, they allow xjCxi for some xi but xjSx0i for some other
x0i. Furthermore, even if A2 and A3 are strengthened to xjCxi (similarly for xjSxi) for all
i; j 2 N and x 2 X, this is still much weaker than the following strategic complementarity
(similarly for substitutability) assumption, which is imposed by most of the literature and
satised by the previous example (1.3).
9To see this more clearly, by (1.1), ui(xi; xj ;x ij)   ui(oi; xj ;x ij)  ui(xi; oj ;x ij)   ui(oi; oj ;x ij)
i¤ (xi; xj ;x ij)  (oi; xj ;x ij)  (xi; oj ;x ij)  (oi; oj ;x ij) i¤ uj(xi; xj ;x ij)  uj(xi; oj ;x ij) 
uj(oi; xj ;x ij)  uj(oi; oj ;x ij).
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Condition 1 (Strategic complementarities) For all i 2 N , oi = 0 2 Xi  R+ and for
all xi; x0i 2 Xi with xi > x0i, ui(xi;x i)  ui(x0i;x i) is weakly increasing in x i 2 X i.
Observe that Condition 1 (henceforth C1) restricts agentsactions to a single dimension
and imposes restrictions on every two pairs of actions (xi; x0i) and (xj ; x
0
j) from any two
agents. Unlike A2 and A3, C1 is far from vacuous when N = 2. Therefore, the extra
exibility of A2 and A3 enables us to study many more contracting situations. For example,
in the context of public good provision, building a public facility involves careful planning,
huge capital, on-site construction, and many other actions. These actions di¤er in nature
and therefore cannot be meaningfully compared along a single dimension. Furthermore,
actions of the same nature may be strategic substitutes (e.g., the provider may need only
one good planner) whereas those of di¤erent nature may be strategic complements. Section
1.4.2 formalizes this example. Note that under A1A3, each action prole x 2 X can be
partitioned into several groups, in which xjCxi if xj and xi belong to the same group and
xjSxi otherwise.10 And A1A3 allow di¤erent action proles to have di¤erent partitions.
1.2.1 Solution Concept
Recall that each menu prole p 2 P leads to a di¤erent subgame in stage 2, and some
subgames have multiple equilibria. Naturally, the solution concept is subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium with an equilibrium selection criterion. However, instead of imposing a
specic equilibrium selection criterion as most of the literature does, I derive results that
are relevant to every equilibrium selection criterion. To state the main result (Theorem
1) in Section 1.3, I need to dene two notions. The rst notion compares two equilibrium
selection criteria.
Denition 2 One equilibrium selection criterion is more pessimistic than the other if, in
every subgame, the equilibrium selected by the former gives the principal a weakly lower
expected payo¤ than that by the latter.
10See the proof of Proposition 1 (p. 71) for how to partition each action prole. Bernstein and Winter
(2012, Section 3.D) study a similar interaction structure in their binary-action model.
10
Observe from this denition that (i) any equilibrium selection criterion is more pes-
simistic than itself and (ii) the most pessimistic (optimistic) equilibrium selection criterion
is the one that always selects the worst (best) equilibrium for the principal.
The second notion is an equilibrium selection criterion originated from potential game
theory. For a weighted potential game, it is known that the maximizer of the potential
function exists, is generically unique, and is a (generically pure-strategy) Nash equilib-
rium.11 Furthermore, as I will prove shortly, every subgame is a weighted potential game
as long as A1 holds. Hence, a well-dened equilibrium selection criterion is to select the
potential maximizer in every subgame, and it is called potential maximization.
As we will see, the proof of Theorem 1 consists of three steps. First, I derive the
equilibrium outcome under potential maximization. Precisely, I show that weight-ranked
divide-and-conquer (w-DC) contracts are optimal to the principal under potential max-
imization. This is the most di¢ cult step, but it is only an intermediate step. Because
after that, I show that the w-DC contracts remain optimal for all equilibrium selection
criteria that are more pessimistic than potential maximization. Lastly, I show that the
w-DC contracts may be suboptimal if the underlying equilibrium selection criterion is not
more pessimistic than potential maximization. By combining the latter two results, I have
identied the entire set of equilibrium selection criteria for which the w-DC contracts are
always optimal.
Before proceeding, we need to take care of two technical issues. For expositional con-
venience, I formally dene an equilibrium selection criterion as a function f : P ! (X)
where f(p) is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame with p set by the principal in stage
1. With a slight abuse of notation, let F (x)  fp 2 P jf(p) = xg denote the set of
11Given X is compact and all the ui functions (and thus the potential function ) are continuous,
the potential maximizer exists by the extreme value theorem. See p. 78 for generic uniqueness of the
potential maximizer. The potential maximizer is a Nash equilibrium: if someone deviates from the potential
maximizer, the potential will decrease, and, by (1.1), the deviator will have a lower payo¤. The potential
of a mixed-strategy equilibrium is a convex combination of the potentials dened on the set of pure-
strategy action proles. Therefore, a mixed-strategy equilibrium is a potential maximizer only when all the
respective pure-strategy action proles are also potential maximizers; this is highly non-generic. For more
interpretations of weighted potential games, see Chan (2019, Section 2.3).
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menu proles implementing x 2 (X) under f . Thus, an equilibrium selection criterion f
is expressed and henceforth interpreted as an implementation requirement, which is fully
characterized by F  (F (x))x2(X). The rst issue is that an optimal contracting scheme
may not exist because F (x) is not always closed.12 To guarantee existence, I slightly relax
each implementation requirement F by enlarging F (x) to its closure for all x 2 (X).
The second issue is that potential maximization fails to select a unique equilibrium when
there are multiple potential maximizers in a non-generic subgame. Nevertheless, the above
enlargement already solves this issue. Precisely, after the enlargement, the principal can
select among potential maximizers.
1.3 Analysis
The analysis before Proposition 1 relies only on A1; the subsequent analysis relies on all
three assumptions. Detailed interpretation of the results is deferred to Section 1.3.1. As
mentioned, the rst step is to analyze the model under potential maximization. To do
so, rst I need to show that as long as agentsutilities u constitute a weighted potential
game, any subgame with an arbitrary menu prole p 2 P o¤ered by the principal is also a
weighted potential game. All proofs are in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 Every subgame is a weighted potential game with the same weight vector w







Under potential maximization, the principals problem can be formulated as the fol-
lowing two-step optimization problem. In step 1, given a target action prole x̂ 2 X,13
12To illustrate, consider a one-agent example with X1 = fo1 = 0; 1g, u1(0) = 0, u1(1) = 1, and
U(x1; p1(x1)) = p1(x1). Multiple equilibria exist only when p1(1) = 1. If f selects x1 = 0 when p1(1) = 1
(and thus F (1) = fp1 2 P1jp1(1) < 1g, which is not closed), then an optimal contracting scheme does not
exist.
13 In the highly non-generic case where a mixed-strategy equilibrium is a potential maximizer (see footnote
11), the principal can select among all the respective pure-strategy potential maximizers. Given her expected
payo¤ at the mixed-strategy potential maximizer is a convex combination of her payo¤s at the respective
pure-strategy potential maximizers, she can, without loss of optimality, neglect the mixed-strategy potential
maximizer and select among the respective pure-strategy potential maximizers.
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pi(x̂i)) s.t. p(x̂)  p(x) for all x 2 X: (1.6)







The main analysis is on the step-1 problem (1.6). Observe that given a xed x̂, the
principals objective is to maximize her total revenue
P
i pi(x̂i). Also, the constraints can










 (x̂)  (x) for all x 2 X: (1.8)
Now observe that charging arbitrarily high prices pi(xi) for all xi =2 foi; x̂ig of every agent
i 2 N relaxes all constraints involving xi =2 foi; x̂ig and has no impact on her total revenue.
Therefore, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under potential maximization, the principal can restrict herself to o¤ering (at
most) one contract to each agent without loss of optimality.
Under this restriction, agent i only chooses from foi; x̂ig if x̂i 6= oi and chooses the
outside option otherwise. Denote N̂  fi 2 N jx̂i 6= oig as the set of agents whom the
principal wants to contract with, p̂i  pi(x̂i) as the respective contract price, and p̂ 
(p̂i)i2N̂ as the price vector. The step-1 problem (1.8) is further simplied as follows.
Lemma 3 For any target action prole x̂ 2 X, the principals optimal contracts under














Without A2 or A3, the above nite linear program is still computationally very tractable.
With A2 and A3, the optimal contracts have closed forms as characterized by the following
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proposition.
Proposition 1 Relabel the agents such that w1      wN . For any target action prole
x̂ 2 X, the principals optimal contracts under potential maximization are
p̂i = ui(x̂1; : : : ; x̂i 1; x̂i; ŷi+1; : : : ; ŷN )  ui(x̂1; : : : ; x̂i 1; oi; ŷi+1; : : : ; ŷN ) for all i 2 N;
(1.10)
where ŷj = oj if x̂jCx̂i and ŷj = x̂j otherwise.14 If w1 <    < wN , the above contracts are
the unique optimal contracts.
I call the above contracts (1.10) weight-ranked divide-and-conquer (w-DC) contracts.
To better understand the w-DC contracts, rst consider the following special case where
all target actions are strategic complements.
Corollary 1 If x̂jCx̂i for all i; j 2 N , the w-DC contracts reduce to
p̂i = ui(x̂1; : : : ; x̂i; oi+1; : : : ; oN )  ui(x̂1; : : : ; x̂i 1; oi; : : : ; oN ) for all i 2 N: (1.11)
I call (1.11) weight-ranked simple divide-and-conquer (w-SDC) contracts. In words, the
w-SDC contracts rank agents in increasing order of weight wi and o¤er each agent a price
that would make him indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er if all agents
who precede him in the ranking accept their o¤ers and all subsequent agents reject their
o¤ers. Given that x̂jCx̂i for all i; j 2 N , the rst agent has a weakly dominant strategy to
accept the o¤er.15 And given the rst agent accepts the o¤er, the second agent also has
an (iterated) weakly dominant strategy to accept the o¤er, and so on. Thus, the w-SDC
contracts in fact implement x̂ as a dominance-solvable equilibrium in this special case.
In the general case, the w-DC contracts rene the w-SDC contracts by compensating
for the strategic substitutabilities from all subsequent agents. By the same token, the
14For notational convenience, the optimal contracts also include agents with x̂i = oi. For these agents,
we have p̂i = 0, which coincides with the requirement that pi(oi) = 0.
15Formally, we have u1(x̂1;x 1)   p̂1  u1(o1;x 1) for all x 1 2
Q
i6=1foi; x̂ig. This is because p̂

1 =
u1(x̂1;o 1) u1(o) by (1.11) and x̂iCx̂1 for all i 6= 1 implies u1(x̂1;x 1) u1(o1;x 1)  u1(x̂1;o 1) u1(o)




w-DC contracts implement x̂ as a dominance-solvable equilibrium in this case.16 Note
that what I have just described is a property of the w-DC contracts, i.e., it is unrelated
to the underlying equilibrium selection criterion. In other words, under any equilibrium
selection criterion, the principal can always o¤er the w-DC contracts and implement x̂ in
the same dominance-solvable way.17 In addition, under any equilibrium selection criterion
more pessimistic than potential maximization, the principal, by Denition 2, cannot do
better than she does under potential maximization. Therefore, the w-DC contracts remain
optimal for all these equilibrium selection criteria. In the proof of Theorem 1, I construct a
simple two-agent two-action example, in which the w-DC contracts are suboptimal for all
equilibrium selection criteria that are not more pessimistic than potential maximization.
This completes the proof of the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1 The w-DC contracts are optimal for all games if and only if the underlying
equilibrium selection criterion is more pessimistic than potential maximization.
I now restrict attention to situations in which the principal always o¤ers the w-DC
contracts and analyze her step-2 problem (1.7). From (1.10), her equilibrium payo¤ given








wi[(x̂1; : : : ; x̂i 1; x̂i; ŷi+1; : : : ; ŷN )  (x̂1; : : : ; x̂i 1; oi; ŷi+1; : : : ; ŷN )]):
She then chooses the optimal action prole x 2 X to maximize the above payo¤ function.
If x̂jCx̂i for all i; j 2 N and all agents have the same weight of w, the payo¤ function is
simplied to U(x̂; w[(x̂)  (o)]). Hence, we have the following corollary.
16Similar to footnote 15, we have u1(x̂1;x 1)   p̂1  u1(o1;x 1) for all x 1 2
Q
i6=1foi; x̂ig. This is
because p̂1 = u1(x̂1; ŷ 1)   u1(o1; ŷ 1) by (1.10) and ŷi = oi if x̂iCx̂1 and ŷi = x̂i otherwise imply
u1(x̂1;x 1)  u1(o1;x 1)  u1(x̂1; ŷ 1)  u1(o1; ŷ 1) for all x 1 2
Q
i6=1foi; x̂ig.
17Note that x̂ becomes the unique and strict Nash equilibrium if the principal charges each agent a price
slightly lower than that of the w-DC contracts. The enlargement of F (x̂) to its closure on p. 11 guarantees
she can implement x̂ with the w-DC contracts under any equilibrium selection criterion.
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Recall from p. 8 that xjCxi for all i; j 2 N and x 2 X is much weaker than C1.
Also, all agents having the same weight does not imply they are identical. Section 1.4
demonstrates how agents can be heterogeneous in many aspects while having the same
weight.
1.3.1 Discussion
Interpretation of Theorem 1 A direct implication is that the principal should/would
o¤er the w-DC contracts as long as the underlying equilibrium selection criterion is quite
pessimistic. In practice, the principal (or we, as researchers) may be uncertain about
which equilibrium will arise when there are multiple equilibria. In this scenario, Theorem
1 implies that as long as she is not very optimistic, then she should/would, again, o¤er the
w-DC contracts. Note that even if the underlying equilibrium selection criterion is more
optimistic (or not more pessimistic) than potential maximization, the w-DC contracts can
still be optimal for many games, just not for all games. Therefore, the use of the w-DC
contracts is indeed robust in many scenarios.
AgentsRanking as Prioritization A high (low) ranking in the divide-and-conquer
contracts means that the agent is (not) prioritized. In particular, the contract prices (1.10)
are set in a way that the highest ranked agent 1 has a dominant strategy to accept the
o¤er, whereas the lowest ranked agent N is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the
o¤er in equilibrium. In the special case where all agents have the same weight, Proposition
1 shows that the principal can rank them in an arbitrary order. However, every agent
wishes to be ranked higher because he would receive a lower price, or in other words, a
more favorable contract.
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Optimal Ranking When agents have di¤erent weights, Proposition 1 shows that the
principal optimally ranks them in ascending order of weight wi. To understand the ra-
tionale of this ranking, rst consider the polar case where x̂jCx̂i for all i; j 2 N . This,
together with (1.1), implies (x̂i;x i)   (oi;x i) is increasing in x i 2
Q
j 6=ifoj ; x̂jg
if we view oj as 0 and x̂j as 1. In other words, the potential function  captures the
strategic complementarities among agentstarget actions. Observe from (1.2) that agents
with higher weights care more about , i.e., they care more about the strategic comple-
mentarities. Therefore, by placing them at lower ranks in the (simple) divide-and-conquer
contracts, the principal can extract more surplus. Now consider the other polar case where
x̂jSx̂i for all i; j 2 N . Observe from (1.10) that each agents price is ui(x̂)   ui(oi; x̂ i)
no matter how we relabel the agents,18 i.e., the ranking does not matter at all. In other
words, the strategic substitutabilities among agents play no role in the ranking decision.
The insights from these two polar cases carry over to the general case, and therefore the
principal optimally ranks agents in increasing weight. A1 is based on agentsutilities u,
and therefore so is the weight vector w.19 Section 1.4 studies three examples of u and
demonstrates how w di¤ers in di¤erent contexts.
Implementation Requirements The previous analysis focuses on equilibrium selec-
tion criteria, which is one type of implementation requirements as explained on p. 10.
I now extend Theorem 1 if we are also interested in other implementation requirements.
Recall that an implementation requirement is fully characterized by F  (F (x))x2(X)
where F (x)  P . I say one implementation requirement F is stronger than the other F 0 if
F (x)  F 0(x) for all x 2 (X). Note that strongerand more pessimisticare di¤erent
18 In other words, every agent is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er in equilibrium when
all target actions are strategic substitutes.
19Clearly, w is independent of the principals payo¤U . Shrinking agentsaction sets Xi also has no impact
on w. In the context of capital raising, this implies that the optimal ranking to o¤er divide-and-conquer
contracts is independent of agentscapital endowments; this is opposite to the main nding of Halac et al.
(2020). The di¤erence in results stems from the fact that their principal can only make payment contingent
on a stochastic outcome but not on the chosen action.
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concepts.20 Let F denote the set of equilibrium selection criteria more pessimistic than po-
tential maximization and F be an implementation requirement where F (x) =
S
F2F F (x).
By construction, F is weaker than each F 2 F . Yet, the fact that the w-DC contracts are
optimal for all F 2 F implies they remain optimal under F . In addition, recall that the
w-DC contracts implement the target action prole as a dominance-solvable equilibrium,
and therefore they remain feasible under the very strong requirement of dominance-solvable
implementation. The above two ndings imply the following corollary.
Corollary 3 The w-DC contracts are optimal for all games if the underlying implementa-
tion requirement is stronger than F and weaker than dominance-solvable implementation.
Divide and Conquer Although the term divide and conqueris not formally dened in
this literature, a coherent denition is to implement a target action prole as a dominance-
solvable equilibrium.Hence, the use of divide-and-conquer contracting schemes per se is
not particularly interesting because it is tautological under the requirement of dominance-
solvable implementation. An interesting result in the literature (see p. 4) is that sometimes
divide-and-conquer contracting schemes remain optimal under the weaker requirement (but
still stronger than every equilibrium selection criterion) of unique implementation, i.e., to
implement a target action prole as the unique Nash equilibrium. Theorem 1 and Corol-
lary 3 show that, for a large class of contracting models, a specic divide-and-conquer
contracting scheme the w-DC contracts is optimal for a large class of equilibrium se-
lection criteria and implementation requirements. In other words, the use of the w-DC
contracts is a common phenomenon, which need not be justied by some strong implemen-
tation requirements.
Single Contract Lemma 2, Theorem 1, and Corollary 3 together imply that the prin-
cipal can, without loss of optimality, o¤er one contract to each agent for a large class of
20 In fact, before the enlargement (see p. 11), any equilibrium selection criterion F is not stronger than
the other F 0 because fF (x)gx2(X) and fF 0(x)gx2(X) are di¤erent partitions of P . This also implies that
any implementation requirement strictly stronger than an equilibrium selection criterion rules out the use
of certain menu proles p 2 P .
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equilibrium selection criteria and implementation requirements. This result is non-trivial
because a major contribution of Segal (2003, Lemma 3) is to show that, under C1 and the
requirement of unique implementation, the principal is generally better o¤ o¤ering multi-
ple contracts to each agent. It turns out that just imposing A1A3 already rules out this
possibility.
1.4 Applications
This section applies the previous results to (i) networks, (ii) public goods, and (iii) im-
pure public goods, and derives novel implications for each application. These applications
together demonstrate how seemingly contradictory implications across applications are rec-
onciled with the general theories developed in Section 1.3.
1.4.1 Networks
I now revisit the general example (1.3). Observe that it encompasses the two most popular
forms of network games: the binary-action form if Xi = f0; 1g and the linear-quadratic
form if bi(xi) = ixi   ix2i . In the former, the principals contracting scheme reduces to
charging each agent a participation fee pi(1). Agentsutilities u clearly satisfy C1 (which
implies A2 and A3); the following lemma shows that they also satisfy A1.




















Therefore, all previous results apply to this example. Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 imply
the following corollary.
Corollary 4 Under any equilibrium selection criterion more pessimistic than potential








Agentsranking in thew-SDC contracts is based solely on their valuation-to-importance
ratios vii but not Xi, bi, or Ei. This generalizes the main nding of Sakovics and Steiner
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(2012, Proposition 2), who study a binary-action complete network (i.e., Xi = f0; 1g and
Ei = Nnfig) under global-game selection (which is equivalent to potential maximization
as stated in footnote 5). They show that the optimal ranking depends on vii but not bi.
Corollary 4 shows that the ranking is also independent of agentsaction sets Xi and sets
of interacting agents Ei, and this result is robust to all equilibrium selection criteria more
pessimistic than global-game selection. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the
principal should prioritize agents with important positions in the network (e.g., the center
agent in a star network), the entire network structure actually plays no role in the ranking
decision. Furthermore, as we will see more clearly in (1.13), an agent faces a higher, not
lower, price if he interacts with more agents.
When all agents have the same weight, they can still di¤er in all other three dimensions
(Xi; bi; Ei). The literature on the economics of networks often assumes vi = i = 1 for all
i. This assumption implies wi = 1 for all i, and therefore the principals optimal action
prole x is characterized by Corollary 2. Also, recall from p. 15 that the principal can rank
agents arbitrarily in this case. This echoes the previous nding: the principal has no strict
incentive to prioritize and o¤er more favorable contracts to agents with high centrality.
I now discuss further implications of this network model. For expositional convenience,
assumeXi = f0; 1g for all i, v11 <    <
vN
N
(which implies w1 <    < wN ), and x̂ = x = 1.
The w-SDC contracts (1.11) are given by
pi (1) = bi(1)  bi(0) + vi
X
j2Ei:wj<wi
j for all i 2 N: (1.13)
Hence, agent is equilibrium payo¤ is




Now consider a scenario in which agent i interacts with an additional agent j =2 Ei. Agent
i is strictly better o¤ if wj > wi: he pays the same price but derives additional interaction
benets. Conditional on wj > wi, he most prefers the additional agent with the highest
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importance j . By contrast, agent i is just as well o¤ if wj < wi: the principal raises
his price by an amount equal to his additional interaction benets. In any case, agent i
does not mind interacting with more agents. Therefore, if the network is endogenously
formed in stage 0, a natural formation process is that each agent unilaterally enables a few
interactions. Under this process, agents with high weights vii and/or importance i end
up interacting with many agents in equilibrium. In other words, popular agents are those
who value the network a lot and those with either high or low importance. If all agents
have the same valuation and can only enable one interaction, an assortative line network
is formed in which agent i chooses agent i+1 (agent N is indi¤erent between choosing any
agent). To the best of my knowledge, these ndings are novel to the literature on network
formation.
1.4.2 Public Goods
I now formalize the example described on p. 9. Recall that building a public facility
involves many incomparable actions. Therefore, I keep each agents action set Xi as the
most general form, i.e., it can be any compact set. Agent is utility takes the following
form:
ui(x) = bi(xi) + vig(x); (1.14)
where bi : Xi ! R measures his stand-alone benet/cost, vi 2 R++ measures his valuation
of the public good, and g : X ! R measures the size of the public good. Agents can di¤er
in four dimensions: (Xi; bi; vi) and how each agents actions xi a¤ect the size of the public
good g. The function g can be very general (but not arbitrary as I will explain shortly),
and it captures the nature (in particular, the importance) of each agents contribution to
the public good. For example, if oi = 0 2 Xi  R+ and g(x) = (
P
j jxj)
2, then j 2 R++
measures the relative importance of agent js actions as in the network model (1.3). The
following lemma shows that agentsutilities u satisfy A1.
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To state the condition for u to satisfy A2 and A3, I rst dene the modied binary
relations Cg and Sg as follows.
Denition 3 The expression xjCgxi (xjSgxi) stands for
g(xi; xj ;x ij)  g(oi; xj ;x ij)  () g(xi; oj ;x ij)  g(oi; oj ;x ij) 8x ij 2 X ij :
We can easily verify that xjCxi (xjSxi) if and only if xjCgxi (xjSgxi). Therefore, A2
and A3 hold if and only if they remain true when C and S are replaced by Cg and Sg
respectively. Suppose they indeed remain true. Then all results in Section 1.3 apply to
this model; Theorem 1 implies the following corollary.
Corollary 5 Under any equilibrium selection criterion more pessimistic than potential
maximization, the principals optimal contracting scheme is to o¤er the w-DC contracts
where w = (vi)i.
Agentsranking in the w-DC contracts is based solely on their valuations of the public
good vi but not Xi, bi, or g. In contrast to the network model where the optimal ranking
depends crucially on agentsimportance i by Corollary 4, the ranking is now independent
of their importance to the public good (as captured by g). The reason for these opposing
results is that the public good is non-excludable whereas the network goodis excludable,
in which an agent derives zero interaction benet whenever he rejects the o¤er. In other
words, the principals optimal contracting scheme depends critically on the excludability
of externalities. Section 1.4.3 formalizes the above arguments. Recall from p. 18 that the
main nding of Sakovics and Steiner (2012) is a special case of Corollary 4 and, therefore,
does not apply to public goods or, more generally, non-excludable externalities. This
urges caution in applying their proposed contracting scheme to their leading applications:
economic development and nancial fragility; both are largely public goods/bads in nature
or at least partially non-excludable. Section 1.4.3 proposes a rened contracting scheme.
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1.4.3 Impure Public Goods
Consider a hybrid of the previous network and public good models. Agent is action set
Xi is a compact subset of R+ with oi = 0 2 Xi. Agent is utility takes the following form:














+ (1  )i(x i)| {z };
pure externalities
where  2 [0; 1] measures the degree of excludability, i : X i ! R measures the pure
externalities generated by others actions, and bi : Xi ! R, vi 2 R++, and j 2 R++
are interpreted the same way as before. Both public-good and pure externalities are non-
excludable, but the latter play no strategic role. In fact, adding arbitrary pure externalities
to agentsutilities in the previous models makes them more general and has no impact on
subsequent results. If  = 1, this model reduces to the network model (1.3) with a complete




2. Agentsutilities clearly satisfy C1; they also satisfy A1.21
Lemma 6 Agentsutilities constitute a weighted potential game with w =






















Therefore, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 6 Under any equilibrium selection criterion more pessimistic than potential
maximization, the principals optimal contracting scheme is to o¤er the w-SDC contracts
where w =





In this model, the optimal ranking is determined by the weighted average of each
agents valuation-to-importance ratio vii (which is the only determinant in the network
model) and his valuation vi (which is the only determinant in the public good model), and
21The fact that this model is (a special case of) a convex combination of the previous two models does
not imply it satises A1 because a convex combination of two weighted potential games need not be a
weighted potential game. Furthermore, even if the combination turns out to be a weighted potential game,
the corresponding weights need not be a convex combination of the previous weights. Therefore, what the
following lemma shows are specic to this model rather than some universal facts.
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the relative weight depends on the degree of excludability . In other words, the princi-
pal always prioritizes agents with low valuations, whereas she also prioritizes those with
high importance if and only if the externalities are su¢ ciently excludable. As mentioned,
economic development and nancial fragility are at least partially non-excludable, in that
almost everyone benets from a strong economy and su¤ers from a nancial crisis. Hence,
Corollary 6 provides theoretical guidance on sectoral industrial policies for the former and
nancial policies for the latter. Note that agentsaction sets Xi play no role in the optimal
ranking for this and all previous models. In other words, the principal need not priori-
tize large agents who can take large actions xi 2 Xi and a¤ect everyone signicantly.
This suggests that the well-known too-big-to-faildoctrine of bailing out large nancial
institutions (say, ranking agents in decreasing maxXi in the divide-and-conquer contracts)
may be suboptimal for preventing nancial crises.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the question of what contracts the principal should or would o¤er
when there are multiple agents. For a large class of contracting models, I show that the
w-DC contracts are optimal for a large class of equilibrium selection criteria and imple-
mentation requirements. This result provides robust predictions and policy guidance for a
wide variety of applications especially when we, as researchers, do not know the underlying
equilibrium selection criterion or what implementation requirement the principal wants to
meet. Finally, the general framework, newly developed tools, and the utilization of poten-




Divide and Conquer in Two-Sided Markets: A
Potential-Game Approach
2.1 Introduction
Two groups of agents often interact via platforms: men and women meet in a nightclub,
buyers and sellers trade on a marketplace, consumers and merchants transact through a
payment card, and so on. These markets are known as two-sided markets. Typically,
positive cross-side network e¤ects are present in these markets, creating strategic com-
plementarities among agents. For example, a man (woman) wants to join a heterosexual
nightclub only if some women (men) join the nightclub. Therefore, to attract men, the
nightclub needs to attract many women, but to attract women, the nightclub needs to
attract many men. This issue is known as the classic chicken-and-eggproblem (Caillaud
and Jullien 2003), one of the most di¢ cult challenges for many two-sided platforms and a
methodological challenge for researchers on two-sided markets.
Formally, in a typical two-sided market model where platforms set prices in stage 1
and all agents simultaneously make their participation decisions in stage 2, agents often
engage in a coordination game with multiple Nash equilibria. For example, when there is a
monopoly platform and agents from the same side are identical, there can be two equilibria
in stage 2: (i) all agents join the platform and (ii) no one joins the platform. When there
are competing platforms, most (if not all) agents will coordinate on one of the platforms
in equilibrium if network e¤ects are su¢ ciently strong; but which one will they coordinate
on? In other words, how should we deal with this multiple equilibria issue?
As I will elaborate in the Related Literature, researchers on two-sided markets impose
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various selection criteria to get rid of multiple equilibria. However, each selection criterion
only works for some models but not others. Moreover, di¤erent selection criteria often lead
to conicting predictions and implications. Therefore, there is a methodological challenge
of selecting a suitable equilibrium. In response to this challenge, this paper proposes using a
renement of Nash equilibrium, called potential maximization, to resolve the multiplicity of
Nash equilibria in two-sided markets. As I will explain, this renement is justied by many
solid microfoundations in the game theory literature, widely supported by experimental
evidence, well describes agent behavior in two-sided markets, applicable to many two-sided
market models, yields realistic predictions, and very tractable.
To illustrate the aforementioned challenge and proposed solution, consider the following
example where a woman (row player) and a man (column player) decide whether to join a
nightclub:
Join Not join
Join v1   p1; v2   p2  p1; 0
Not join 0; p2 0; 0
(2.1)
For a wide range of fees (p1; p2) 2 [0; v1] [0; v2] set by the nightclub, both (Join, Join) and
(Not join, Not join) are equilibria. A frequently used selection criterion, Pareto dominance,
selects the former whenever there are multiple equilibria, leading to the prediction that the
nightclub optimally sets p1 = v1 and p

2 = v2. It also predicts that both agents join the
nightclub and derive zero payo¤ in equilibrium, even though each risks a negative payo¤
of  vi if the other does not show up and can guarantee him/herself a zero payo¤ by not
joining the nightclub.
I now turn to potential maximization, which coincides with the well-known risk domi-
nance criterion (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) in 2-by-2 games. By denition,1 (Join, Join) is
the risk-dominant equilibrium if and only if (v1   p1)(v2   p2)  p1p2, which is simplied
to p1=v1 + p2=v2  1. Intuitively, risk dominance predicts that both agents will join the
1Generally, (J; J) risk dominates (N;N) if [u1(J; J)   u1(N; J)][u2(J; J)   u2(J;N)]  [u1(N;N)  
u1(J;N)][u2(N;N)  u2(N; J)]:
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nightclub only when it is relatively safe to do so. Hence, the nightclub maximizes p1 + p2
subject to p1=v1 + p2=v2  1. If the man enjoys the nightclub more than the woman (i.e.,
v2 > v1) even by just a little, the nightclub will optimally set p1 = 0 and p

2 = v2: this is
the ladiesnightphenomenon. More generally, the above pricing strategy that subsidizes
one side and charges the other is called divide and conquerin the literature.
Besides nightclubs, many other two-sided platforms also divide and conquer in practice:
shoppers visit shopping malls for free while retailers pay the rent; consumers are paid to use
credit cards while merchants pay for the service; open access journals are freely available
to readers while authors pay submission and publication fees (the latter is US$3,100 for
the open access option of The RAND Journal of Economics); buyers receive o¤ers from
daily deal sites (e.g., Groupon, LivingSocial) at no charge while sellers typically split the
revenue 50/50 with the sites (Dholakia 2011), and the list goes on.
All the above examples involve more than two agents, making risk dominance inapplica-
ble. Nevertheless, a generalization of risk dominance, potential maximization, is applicable
to many multi-agent models. To introduce this selection criterion in the simplest way,
Section 2.2 extends the illustrative example (2.1) with multiple identical agents on each
side; it is also the identical-agent version of Armstrongs (2006, Section 3) monopoly model.
Similar to (2.1), under potential maximization, the platform has to ensure su¢ ciently low
miscoordination cost by pricing low enough in stage 1 so that all agents will join the plat-
form in stage 2. Again, the platforms optimal pricing strategy is to divide and conquer.
The sole determinant of which side to divide (i.e., subsidize) or conquer (i.e., monetize)
is the relative size of cross-side network e¤ects (which corresponds to whether v1 or v2
is larger in (2.1)), i.e., independent of the number of agents on each side and the costs
of serving the agents. This divide-and-conquer strategy implies that the optimal design
of the prot-maximizing platform is to favor the conquer side only, which is socially
suboptimal.
Section 2.3 studies platform competition under potential maximization and derives
further insights into two-sided markets. The model in Section 2.2 is naturally extended
27
with two potentially asymmetric platforms. Under potential maximization, the platforms
price-setting stage is analogous to standard Bertrand competition. In equilibrium, the
entire market tips to an endogenously determined platform. Again, this dominant platform
always divides and conquers. Which side to divide/conquer now depends on the relative
size of average cross-side network e¤ects across the competing platforms instead of its own
cross-side network e¤ects of the two sides. The optimal design of platforms now tends to
favor both sides (the conquer side) when the platforms are very (not) competitive.
Section 2.4 further justies the use of potential maximization in two-sided markets and
compares it with selection criteria commonly used in this literature. Section 2.5 studies
various extensions to show the generality of potential maximization and derive further
insights into two-sided markets. In particular, potential maximization is applicable to
models with (i) alternative pricing instruments such as transaction fees and two-part tari¤s,
(ii) heterogeneous agents in terms of their stand-alone and interaction benets from joining
a platform as well as their importance to agents on the other side, (iii) more than two
platforms, (iv) price discrimination, (v) same-side network e¤ects, (vi) more than two
stages, and (vii) an innite number of agents. Section 2.6 concludes. The rest of this
section reviews the related literature.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on two-sided markets pioneered by Caillaud and
Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), and Armstrong (2006). The latter three
study the case where agents are su¢ ciently heterogeneous to guarantee a unique equilibrium
in the model. Their common nding is that a platform will divide and conquer if and only
if the elasticities of demand or cross-side network e¤ects of the two sides di¤er a lot. By
contrast, agents from the same side are identical in Caillaud and Julliens (2003) model, and
therefore multiple equilibria arise in their duopoly model. To single out an equilibrium,
they impose monotonicity, i.e., to assume the number of agents on each side joining a
platform decreases with the platforms prices. When they study two modied models
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(Sections 3 and 5), they impose both monotonicity and focality,2 i.e., to assume all agents
always coordinate on a pre-specied platform whenever multiple equilibria exist. Under
their selection criteria, the competing platforms may divide and conquer (see also Jullien
2011). In contrast to all these seminal papers, Section 2.2 of this paper derives the divide-
and-conquer strategy in an identical-agent monopoly model under potential maximization.
In other words, the use of this strategy need not rely on heterogeneous agents or platform
competition.
Other popular selection criteria in this literature are Pareto dominance, i.e., to select
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium; coalition-proofness (e.g., Ambrus and Argenziano 2009;
Karle et al. 2020), i.e., to allow joint deviations by any subset of agents; and insulating
tari¤s (e.g., Weyl 2010; White and Weyl 2016), i.e., to allow platformsprices contingent
on participation decisions of agents on all platforms. To the best of my knowledge, this
paper is the rst to introduce potential maximization into two-sided markets.
Potential maximization renes Nash equilibrium in potential games, a concept intro-
duced by Rosenthal (1973) and formalized by Monderer and Shapley (1996). Section 2.2.3
explains both concepts in detail. Many equilibrium selection criteria in the game theory
literature coincide with potential maximization if a game is a supermodular weighted po-
tential game.3 For example, Frankel et al. (2003) prove that the unique equilibrium under
global-game selection (Carlsson and van Damme 1993; Morris and Shin 2003) is the po-
tential maximizer, the equilibrium pinned down by potential maximization. Under perfect
foresight dynamics (Matsui and Matsuyama 1995), the potential maximizer is the unique
absorbing and globally accessible state (Hofbauer and Sorger 1999, 2002; Oyama et al.
2008). Under log-linear dynamics, the potential maximizer is the unique stochastically sta-
ble state (Blume 1993; Young 1998; Okada and Tercieux 2012; see also Myatt and Wallace
2This selection criterion is also called good/bad or favorable/unfavorable expectations (e.g., Caillaud and
Jullien 2001; Hagiu 2006), optimistic/pessimistic beliefs (e.g., Caillaud and Jullien 2003), or incumbency
advantage (e.g., Biglaiser et al. 2019).
3This implies that we can apply other selection criteria to a potential game and obtain the same pre-
diction. Nevertheless, potential maximization is the most tractable approach because there is no need to
introduce auxiliary incomplete information or dynamic elements, whereas others do.
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2009). Ui (2001) and Morris and Ui (2005) prove that the potential maximizer is robust to
incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997). All the selection criteria
above coincide with risk dominance in 2-by-2 games. In addition to game-theoretic justi-
cations, potential maximization is supported by ample experimental evidence (Van Huyck
et al. 1990; Goeree and Holt 2005; Chen and Chen 2011).4 I provide further justications
in Section 2.4.
Although potential maximization applies only to potential games, many two-sided mar-
ket models are potential games (precisely, every subgame of these two-stage models is a
potential game). In particular, Section 2.5.2 shows that the main models of all four afore-
mentioned seminal papers are weighted potential games. Therefore, we can resolve the




This baseline model is a special case of Armstrongs (2006, Section 3) model in which
agents from the same side are identical. A platform serves two sides of agents, indexed by
1 and 2, and there are N1 side-1 agents and N2 side-2 agents. The game has two stages.
In stage 1, the platform sets subscription fees (p1; p2) 2 R2 to the two sides. In stage 2, all
agents observe p1 and p2 and simultaneously decide whether to join the platform. If the
platform attracts n1 side-1 agents and n2 side-2 agents, the payo¤ of a side-i agent from
joining the platform is
ui(nj ; pi) = vinj   pi; (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j) (2.2)
4Anderson et al. (2001) introduce the notion of stochastic potential by adding some noise to the standard
potential (the former converges to the latter as the noise goes to zero). Goeree and Holt (2005) and Chen
and Chen (2011) nd that subjects often end up at the maximizer of the stochastic potential.
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where vi 2 R++ is the benet of a side-i participant from interacting with each side-j
participant. If an agent does not join the platform, his payo¤ is zero. The platforms
payo¤ is equal to its prot:
(n1; n2; p1; p2) = (p1   c1)n1 + (p2   c2)n2;
where ci 2 R+ is the (su¢ ciently low) cost of serving each side-i participant. The illustra-
tive example (2.1) is the case where N1 = N2 = 1.
2.2.2 Pareto Dominance
I examine the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game. Multiple equilibria often arise in
stage 2 due to cross-side network e¤ects. In particular, there are two (generically strict)5
equilibria when (p1; p2) 2 [0; v1N2]  [0; v2N1]: (i) all agents join the platform and (ii) no
one joins the platform. Clearly, the former Pareto dominates the latter for all agents. As a
benchmark, I characterize the equilibrium outcome under Pareto dominance, i.e., to select
the full-participation equilibrium whenever there are multiple equilibria.
Proposition 1 Under Pareto dominance, the platform sets p1 = v1N2 and p

2 = v2N1.
All agents join the platform with zero surplus, and the platforms equilibrium prot is
 = (v1 + v2)N1N2   c1N1   c2N2.
For this baseline model, it is easy to see that the equilibrium outcomes under focality
(with the platform being focal), coalition-proofness, and insulating tari¤s are all given
by Proposition 1.6 Therefore, this proposition in fact represents the prediction under a
typical selection criterion.
5Throughout this paper, there are some non-strict equilibria such as mixed-strategy equilibria. Nev-
ertheless, it is without loss of generality to ignore them because none of the popular selection criteria or
potential maximization (see footnote 7) will select them.
6Armstrong (2006, p. 672) allows the platform to directly choose agentsutility levels instead of setting
prices; this also leads to the same prediction as in Proposition 1.
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2.2.3 Potential Maximization
Now, I rst introduce potential games and potential maximization, and then I will analyze
the model under potential maximization. First, xing an arbitrary subgame with p 
(p1; p2) 2 R2 set by the platform in stage 1, consider the following function:







Observe from (2.2) and (2.3) that for i; j = 1; 2 (i 6= j),
ui(nj ; pi)  0 = vi[p(ni; nj)  p(ni   1; nj)]: (2.4)
In other words, the function p is constructed in a way that whenever an agent deviates,
the change in p is proportional to the change in the agents payo¤ (the number of side-i
participants decreases by one if a side-i agent switches from joining to not joining the plat-
form). Thus, all agentsstrategic considerations, which concern only unilateral deviations,
are summarized by this single function p. A game is called a (weighted) potential game if
it is possible to construct such a function p, which is also called a potential function. And
I have just shown that every subgame in stage 2 is a weighted potential game. Note that
the potential function (2.3) of this model depends only on the numbers of side-1 and side-2
participants because agents from the same side are identical. When Section 2.5.2 extends
the model to allow for heterogeneous agents, the potential function would have to depend
on agentsaction prole. There I introduce more notation and give the general denition
of a weighted potential game.
The potential function p is a real-valued function, which clearly has a (generically)
unique maximizer. Furthermore, this potential maximizer is a pure-strategy7 Nash equilib-
rium: if someone deviates from the maximizer, the potential will decrease, and, by (2.4),
the deviator will have a lower payo¤. Hence, if there is a unique equilibrium, the potential
7The potential of a mixed-strategy equilibrium is a convex combination of the potentials dened on the
set of pure-strategy action proles. Therefore, generically a mixed-strategy equilibrium is not a potential
maximizer.
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maximizer is the unique equilibrium; if there are multiple equilibria, the potential maxi-
mizer is one with the highest potential. Moreover, as explained in the Related Literature,
many theoretical and experimental studies show that agents often end up at the poten-
tial maximizer. Therefore, this maximizer renes Nash equilibrium in weighted potential
games, and this renement is called potential maximization. Section 2.4 further justies
this renement.
Recall that every subgame of the current model is a weighted potential game. By
applying potential maximization to each subgame, we resolve the multiplicity of Nash
equilibria. The potential maximizer of each subgame is given as follows.
Lemma 1 When p1; p2  0, the potential maximizer is all agents joining the platform if
p1
v1N2
+ p2v2N1  1 and no one joining the platform otherwise.
8
Proof. The only non-trivial case is when (p1; p2) 2 [0; v1N2] [0; v2N1], in which there
are two equilibria. By (2.3), their respective potentials are






N2; p(0; 0) = 0;
and the potential maximizer is the one with the higher potential. 
As shown in Lemma 1, under potential maximization, the platform has to leave enough
surplus to agents by setting su¢ ciently low prices (p1; p2) in stage 1 so that all agents will
join the platform in stage 2. Hence, its prot maximization problem is
max
p1;p20







The solution to this problem is given as follows.
Proposition 2 Suppose v1 < v2. Under potential maximization, the platform sets p1 = 0
and p2 = v2N1. All agents join the platform, and the platforms equilibrium prot is
 = v2N1N2   c1N1   c2N2.




= 1. Nevertheless, the platform can lower
p1 or p2 a bit so that the full-participation equilibrium is the unique potential maximizer. Therefore, for







I now discuss and compare the predictions under Pareto dominance and potential maxi-
mization as summarized by Propositions 1 and 2 respectively. In both cases, the platform
charges side-2 agents the same maximum price and fully extracts their surplus. By con-
trast, under potential maximization, the platform provides free access to side-1 agents and
leaves them a lot of surplus. Therefore, its equilibrium prot is much lower than that under
Pareto dominance. There are three key implications in this model.
Divide and Conquer Under potential maximization, the platforms divide-and-conquer
strategy that subsidizes one side (hereafter the divide side) and monetizes the other (here-
after the conquer side) is ubiquitous because v1 6= v2 in general. Indeed, this pricing
strategy is widely observed in reality (see p. 26 for ve examples). To derive this strat-
egy in the current model without using potential maximization, one would need to rely
on Pareto-dominated selection, i.e., to select the Pareto-dominated equilibrium whenever
multiple equilibria exist. However, this selection criterion is often regarded as even less
plausiblethan Pareto dominance (as elaborated in footnote 17). Surprisingly, the predic-
tion under Pareto-dominated selection coincides with that under potential maximization
in this baseline model.9 Yet, this equivalence is a knife-edge result: it no longer holds when
I extend the model in subsequent sections.
Divide/Conquer Side The only determinant of which side to divide or conquer is the
relative size of per-interaction benets v1 and v2. In other words, the divide/conquer side is
independent of the number of agents N1 and N2 on each side, suggesting that the platform
need not monetize the side with more agents. For example, shopping malls have more
shoppers than retailers, but only the latter are charged. This is because when there are
more, say, side-1 agents, the platform can extract more surplus from side 1. Meanwhile,
9Under Pareto-dominated selection, the platform has to guarantee participation from one side by pro-
viding free access to that side. It then can charge the other side the maximum price. Clearly, the choice of
the divide/conquer side is the same as that under potential maximization.
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having more side-1 agents increases the benets to side-2 agents, and thus the platform
can also extract more surplus from side 2. These two e¤ects cancel out in this model, and
therefore the divide/conquer side does not depend on N1 and N2.
Similarly, the divide/conquer side is independent of the costs of serving the participants
c1 and c2. For example, for open access journals, the marginal cost of an additional reader
is zero whereas reviewing a paper is costly; yet, these journals only charge authors. This is
because in the model, all agents coordinate on either joining or not joining the platform in
equilibrium. Therefore, the total cost c1N1 + c2N2 incurred by the platform is equivalent
to a xed cost, which is irrelevant to the decision on the divide/conquer side.
Optimal Design Oftentimes, agentsper-interaction benets v1 and v2 are not exoge-
nous, but rather the platforms endogenous choice. For example, shopping malls are often
designed to maximize shopperstravel distances by locating anchor stores far from each
other and placing escalators at opposite ends; this benets retailers but harms shoppers.
The following discussion investigates the comparative statics of v1 and v2.
Under Pareto dominance, the optimal design of the platform is to favor both sides, i.e.,
to increase both v1 and v2. This is not true under potential maximization: the platforms
equilibrium prot  is independent of v1 as long as v1 < v2. Therefore, it only has the
incentive to increase v2, i.e., the optimal design of the platform (e.g., shopping mall) is to
favor only the conquer side (e.g., retailers). In addition, under Pareto dominance, social
surplus is equal to the platforms equilibrium prot. This implies that the optimal design
of the platform also maximizes social surplus. By contrast, under potential maximization,
the optimal design of the platform is socially suboptimal because it has no incentive to
increase side-1 agentssurplus by increasing v1.
This section highlights how di¤erent selection criteria can lead to completely di¤erent
predictions and implications: this is the methodological challenge in two-sided markets.
Nevertheless, potential maximization, a renement of Nash equilibrium justied by many
theoretical and experimental studies, yields more realistic predictions in this identical-
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agent monopoly model. Section 2.4.2 further substantiates how potential maximization
better describes agent behavior in two-sided markets than Pareto dominance does. In fact,
the above predictions already capture many distinctive features of two-sided markets. In
other words, these features need not rely on heterogeneous agents or platform competition;
rather, they rely on a suitable selection criterion.
2.3 Platform Competition
This section studies platform competition under potential maximization and derives further
insights into two-sided markets. The previous model is extended to a duopoly model, which
is closely related to Armstrongs (2006, Section 4) and Caillaud and Julliens (2003, Section
5) models.10 Multiple equilibria naturally arise in their models, but they do not attempt to
pin down an equilibrium.11 By contrast, I analyze the model under potential maximization
and derive a unique prediction. For most platform competition models including the current
model, focality is the only popular selection criterion that can single out a unique outcome
(which di¤ers from that of this section). Section 2.4.3 compares and contrasts potential
maximization with focality.
2.3.1 Model
There are now two competing platforms, indexed by A and B. In stage 1, both platforms
simultaneously set prices pm1 and p
m
2 for the two sides (m = A;B). In stage 2, all agents
simultaneously decide which platform to join. Let ni now denote the number of side-i
agents joining platform A. The respective payo¤s of a side-i agent from joining A and B
are
uAi (nj ; p
A
i ) = v
A
i nj   pAi ; uBi (nj ; pBi ) = vBi (Nj   nj)  pBi : (2.5)
10A major di¤erence is that my model allows for asymmetric platforms whereas theirs do not. For
symmetric platforms, mine is a special case of Armstrongs model with zero transport cost for agents (i.e.,
t1 = t2 = 0 in his model).
11 In fact, Armstrong (2006) does not analyze the special case of t1 = t2 = 0 (see footnote 10); he only
analyzes the case where t1 and t2 are su¢ ciently large so that there is a unique market-sharing equilibrium.
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Observe that side-i agents may derive di¤erent per-interaction benets vmi 2 R++ at di¤er-






2 ) = p
A







2 ) = p
B
1 (N1   n1) + pB2 (N2   n2):
Following Armstrong and Wright (2007), I assume the subscription fees pm1 and p
m
2 set by
the platforms are non-negative.13 They argue (p. 356) that this is a reasonable restriction
for subscription models because strictly subsidizing participants will create obvious adverse
selection and moral hazard problems. Armstrong (2006, footnote 5) makes a similar argu-
ment. Note that this model reduces to the baseline model if vB1 = v
B
2 = 0 and platform B




Similar to the previous model, multiple equilibria often arise in stage 2. Let ~p1  pA1   pB1
and ~p2  pA2  pB2 denote the respective price di¤erences between the two platforms. There
are two equilibria when (~p1; ~p2) 2 [ vB1 N2; vA1 N2]  [ vB2 N1; vA2 N1]:14 (i) all agents join
A and (ii) all agents join B. Neither Pareto dominance nor Pareto-dominated selection
is applicable to this model because coordinating on one of the platforms need not Pareto
dominate the other. By contrast, potential maximization remains applicable. Analogous
to Section 2.2.3, we can verify that every subgame with p  (pA1 ; pA2 ; pB1 ; pB2 ) 2 R4 set by
platforms in stage 1 is a weighted potential game with the potential function
p(n1; n2) = n1n2  










12With positive and asymmetric costs cmi across platforms, the identity of the dominant platform (as
characterized by Proposition 3) would also depend on their cost-e¤ectiveness.
13This restriction merely ensures that platformsprice competition in stage 1 is well-behaved. Without
this restriction, every subgame in stage 2 remains a weighted potential game, and therefore potential
maximization can always resolve the multiplicity of equilibria.
14The equilibrium is unique if prices are outside this range. As we will see, platformsequilibrium prices
(as characterized by Proposition 3) indeed fall into this range.
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Precisely, we can show that for i; j = 1; 2 (i 6= j),
uAi (nj ; p
A
i )  uBi (nj ; pBi ) = (vAi + vBi )[p(ni; nj)  p(ni   1; nj)]:
In words, xing othersparticipation decisions, the payo¤ di¤erence between joining A and
B for each agent is proportional to the corresponding di¤erence in p. Similar to the
baseline model, the issue of multiple equilibria can be resolved by selecting the potential
maximizer for each subgame, which is given as follows.
Lemma 2 When (~p1; ~p2) 2 [ vB1 N2; vA1 N2]  [ vB2 N1; vA2 N1], the potential maximizer is






























and all agents joining platform B otherwise.






















N2; p(0; 0) = 0;
and the potential maximizer is the one with the higher potential. 
As shown in Lemma 2, under potential maximization, we can view all agents as a
representative agent who either joins A or B: the value of platform m is vm1 v
m
2 ,











pm2 , and the representative agent joins the platform with
the higher net value. Thus, stage 1 is analogous to standard Bertrand competition.






2 . The standard
analysis of Bertrand competition implies that B sets the minimum prices pB1 = p
B
2 = 0














2   vB1 vB2 :
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Subject to the above constraint, A maximizes its prot by optimally allocating the prices





















2   vB1 vB2 : (2.7)
Solving the above problem gives us platform As optimal pricing strategy.















15 Under potential maxi-
mization, stage 1 is a Bertrand equilibrium with











1 = 0; p
B
2 = 0:










As shown in Proposition 3, the market tips to the platform with the higher value of vm1 v
m
2
regardless of the number of agents N1 and N2 on each side. Following Section 2.2.4, I
discuss the three key implications under the current framework.
Divide and Conquer Similar to the monopolist in the baseline model, the dominant
platform (A) always provides free access to one side and extracts surplus from the other.
The weaker the competitor (in terms of the values of vB1 and v
B
2 ), the more surplus the
dominant platform extracts from the conquer side.
Divide/Conquer Side The divide/conquer side of the dominant platform depends on






2 across the compet-
ing platforms instead of its own per-interaction benets vA1 and v
A
2 . This implies that the
decision on the divide/conquer side for the dominant platform is signicantly a¤ected by







2 , the platformsprices are uniquely given by p
m
i = 0 for all i;m. All agents may coordinate
on either platform; both platforms make zero prot in either case.
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the per-interaction benets delivered by other competing platforms, even though the com-
petitorsmarket shares are negligible. Hence, competition can reverse the divide/conquer
side of the dominant platform. To illustrate, consider the following example:
vA1 = 3; v
A
2 = 2; v
B
1 = 1; v
B
2 = 5: (2.8)
Platform A favors side 1 more than side 2, but platform B favors side 2 much more than side
1. Suppose initially A is a monopolist. By Proposition 2, A charges side 1 and subsidizes
side 2. Suppose now B enters the market. By Proposition 3, A still dominates the market
under competition, but now A subsidizes side 1 and charges side 2. Note from Proposition
2 that B makes a higher prot if A and B are separate monopolists because B can extract
more surplus from one side. In other words, the optimal design of a monopoly platform
might not perform well under competition; this leads us to the discussion on the optimal
design of competing platforms.
Optimal Design If the platforms are very competitive (say, vA1 v
A
2  vB1 vB2 ), the optimal
design of both platforms tends to favor both sides because the one with the lower value of
vm1 v
m
2 has zero market share in equilibrium. By contrast, if one of them is inferior (say,
vB1  vB2  0), the optimal design of the superior platform tends to favor only the conquer











2 )N1N2; it can be less than the social surplus
(vB1 + v
B
2 )N1N2 if all agents coordinate on B instead (see (2.8) as an example). Also, the
optimal design of A is likely to be socially suboptimal: if the platforms are very competitive,
As optimal design tends to maximize vA1 v
A




2 ; if B is inferior, it tends to
favor only the conquer side.
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2.4 Potential Maximization as Equilibrium Selection Criterion
This section further discusses potential maximization and compares it with popular selec-
tion criteria mentioned in the Related Literature.16 First, in addition to microfounded and
experimental justications in the literature, I provide an intuitive justication for potential
maximization. For expositional convenience, this section illustrates with the example (2.1)
whenever helpful. By (2.3), the potential function p of (2.1) is given by
Join Not join
Join 1  p1=v1   p2=v2  p1=v1
Not join  p2=v2 0
(2.9)
Now, if we view (2.9) as an identical interest game in which both agents share the same
payo¤, this game is strategically equivalent to the original game (2.1), in that both agents
have the same best-response correspondence in these two games. Also, for any identical in-
terest game, there is a generically unique Pareto-dominant equilibrium (which corresponds
to the largest of the four numbers in (2.9)); moreover, arguably any reasonable equilibrium
selection criterion would select this equilibrium.17 Hence, if one expects two strategically
equivalent games to have the same (or very similar) strategic behavior, he or she should
also expect agents to coordinate on the potential maximizer in the original game.
2.4.1 Comparison with Monotonicity
Monotonicity is a mild and reasonable restriction on equilibria across subgames. Basically,
in (2.1), it rules out the possibility that (p1; p2)  (p01; p02) but both agents do not join the
nightclub in the former whereas both join in the latter. Clearly, potential maximization
satises monotonicity. In other words, monotonicity implies that if the nightclub increases
the fees (p1; p2) from low to high, at certain fees (p̂1; p̂2) the selected equilibrium switches
from (Join, Join) to (Not join, Not join). However, monotonicity says nothing about
16 Insulating tari¤s enable the use of sophisticated pricing strategies, which, strictly speaking, are not a
selection criterion and therefore not compared here.
17But Pareto-dominated selection selects the opposite, making it a rather unconvincing selection criterion.
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the values of (p̂1; p̂2) and, therefore, cannot pin down a unique equilibrium. From this
perspective, potential maximization strengthens monotonicity by specifying sensible and
microfounded values for (p̂1; p̂2): those satisfying p̂1=v1 + p̂2=v2 = 1.
2.4.2 Comparison with Pareto Dominance and Coalition-Proofness
Pareto dominance can be justied by coalition-proofness, which also selects the Pareto-
dominant equilibrium if it exists. Moreover, they are the only microfounded selection
criteria frequently used in the two-sided market literature. However, in the microfounda-
tion of coalition-proofness (Bernheim et al. 1987; Moreno and Wooders 1996), all agents
can freely discuss their strategies and make non-binding agreements before they simulta-
neously take their actions. This is at odds with what we observe in real-world two-sided
markets, especially for giant platforms with many scattered users. By contrast, none of
the microfoundations of potential maximization involve any form of communication among
agents. It is precisely this lack of (re)assurance that urges agents to take safer actions
rather than gambling on the Pareto-superior outcome in (2.1).
2.4.3 Comparison with Focality
Focality is the only popular selection criterion that can single out an equilibrium for most
platform competition models, including that in Section 2.3 (but the prediction18 di¤ers
from Proposition 3). As mentioned, focality treats platforms unequally by assuming all
agents to always coordinate on a pre-specied platform whenever multiple equilibria ex-
ist. By contrast, potential maximization treats platforms equally in that payo¤-irrelevant
features (e.g., the name) of a platform play no role in the analysis. Focality faces an ad-
ditional challenge: without a specic context, we cannot determine which platform should
be the focalplatform. By contrast, potential maximization unambiguously identies the
dominant platform. In equilibrium, the dominant platform is indeed focal because all
18 It is easy to see that if, say, A is assumed to be the focal platform, it will optimally set pA1 = v
A
1
and pA2 = v
A




2 are unimportant; all agents will join A for any prices.
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agents coordinate on this platform. Yet, this is an equilibrium outcome rather than an
assumption from the start.
When there are multiple equilibria, agentsexpectations are the key. But how these
expectations are formed is equally (if not more) important. As noted in the pioneering work
on network economics by Katz and Shapiro (1985, p. 439), . . . the expectations formation
process remains an important element of the market to model explicitly.They repeated
the same point subsequently (1994, p. 97), . . . the two equilibria are rather di¤erent, and
one would like to have a theory that includes the factors that lead to one outcome or the
other.Yet, this issue is largely ignored in the literature; researchers almost always take
for granted that agentsexpectations are exogenously given.
By contrast, potential maximization microfounds the formation of agentsexpectations
by endogenizing them as Lemmas 1 and 2 demonstrate. Precisely, they quantify how agents
expectations should depend on the fundamentals of the market (i.e., cross-side network
e¤ects v, numbers of agents N , etc.) and platforms prices in a sensible manner (say,
increasing vA1 makes agents more likely to coordinate on platform A, ceteris paribus). After
endogenizing agentsexpectations, Proposition 3 shows that their equilibrium expectations
depend crucially on the strengths of cross-side network e¤ects of the competing platforms.
I thereby address the longest running debate in network economics: do network e¤ects
lead to ine¢ cient lock-in? According to the ndings in this paper, the answer is no. As
shown in Proposition 3, an inferior platform delivering lower per-interaction benets on
both sides is defeated in equilibrium. This implies that quality largely explains the success
of a dominant platform as repeatedly argued by Liebowitz and Margolis (1990, 1994, 1995,
1999, 2013, etc.). This argument is also supported by more recent empirical (Tellis et al.
2009a, 2009b; Gretz 2010) and experimental evidence (Hossain and Morgan 2009; Hossain
et al. 2011). Now, it is further justied by the theoretical results of this paper.
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2.5 Extensions
This section discusses various extensions in which every subgame remains a weighted poten-
tial game and, therefore, potential maximization remains applicable. The detailed analysis
is given in the corresponding appendix; some trivial proofs are omitted.
2.5.1 Alternative Pricing Instruments
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 adopt Armstrongs framework in which agents are charged a subscrip-
tion fee to join a platform. Nevertheless, potential maximization also applies to models
with alternative pricing instruments such as transaction fees and two-part tari¤s. If the
monopoly platform in Section 2.2 uses transaction fees instead of subscription fees, the
model has a unique equilibrium.19 By contrast, multiple equilibria persist even if com-
peting platforms use transaction fees. Hence, potential maximization can be applied to
resolve the multiplicity of equilibria. In the appendix, I modify the model in Section 2.3 so
that competing platforms set transaction fees instead of subscription fees. The platforms
can now adjust the net per-interaction benets of the two sides with transaction fees. This
leads to several di¤erences in the equilibrium outcome. First, the market tips to the plat-
form with the larger sum of per-interaction benets vm1 +v
m
2 instead of the product of them
vm1 v
m
2 . Second, the divide/conquer side depends on its own per-interaction benets v
m
1 and









platforms. Third, the optimal design of platforms is to maximize vm1 +v
m
2 regardless of how
competitive the platforms are; this also maximizes social surplus. I also extend the analysis
to two-part tari¤s and shows that the equilibrium is identical to that of the transaction
model. In other words, when both transaction and subscription fees are available, only the
former are used.
19 In this equilibrium, the platform charges both sides the maximum transaction fees and thus extracts
all agentssurplus.
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2.5.2 Heterogeneous Agents, Multiple Platforms, Price Discrimination
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 deliberately study identical-agent models to (i) introduce potential
maximization in the simplest way and (ii) identify rst-order determinants of distinc-
tive features in two-sided markets. Nevertheless, potential maximization also applies to
heterogeneous-agent models. In the appendix, I allow agents to be heterogeneous in both
their per-interaction and stand-alone benets of joining a platform as well as their impor-
tance to agents on the other side. This encompasses Rochet and Tiroles (2006, Section
5) monopoly model, which in turn encompasses Rochet and Tiroles (2003, Section 2) and
Armstrongs (2006, Section 3) models. For duopoly models, each agent can also derive
di¤erent benets at di¤erent platforms, encompassing Rochet and Tiroles (2003, Section
3) and Armstrongs (2006, Section 4) duopoly models. If each agent derives the same
per-interaction benet at any platform, the model can be further extended to any num-
ber of platforms. In addition, agents can also be given the outside option of not joining
any platform. This encompasses Caillaud and Julliens (2003, Sections 2 and 5) models.
Furthermore, platforms can (perfectly or partially) price discriminate agents; still, every
subgame remains a weighted potential game.
2.5.3 Same-Side Network E¤ects
Sometimes same-side network e¤ects are present on one or both sides of a platform; they
can be positive and increasing (e.g., peer/learning e¤ect) or negative and decreasing (e.g.,
competition/congestion e¤ect). In the appendix, I extend the baseline model with po-
tentially non-monotonic same-side network e¤ects on both sides and shows that every
subgame remains a weighted potential game. I fully characterize the equilibrium under
potential maximization for the case of positive and increasing same-side network e¤ects on
both sides. All three key implications in Section 2.2.4 carry over to this richer framework.
In particular, the platform always divides and conquers, and the divide/conquer side is
independent of same-side network e¤ects.
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2.5.4 General Temporal Structure
This paper follows typical two-sided market models in which all agents make their partici-
pation decisions simultaneously. Nevertheless, potential maximization also applies to more
general temporal structures. In the appendix, I extend the baseline model such that the
platform approaches some agents rst, and then the remaining agents. This may be due
to exogenous or strategic reasons. A possible exogenous reason as emphasized by Hagiu
(2006) is that sometimes agents from one side (e.g., application and game developers) nat-
urally arrive before those from the other (e.g., buyers). I show that every subgame at each
stage is a weighted potential game. If v1 < v2, the platform always extracts all side-2
agents surplus, whereas the revenue from side 1 depends on the numbers of side-1 and
side-2 agents who move rst/later. If the platform can freely choose whom to approach
rst/later, it will approach all agents from one side rst, and then all agents from the other.
It does not matter which side is the rst side; the platform extracts all agentssurplus in
either case. If the platform can only approach a few agents in advance, all the chosen
agents will be from the side with fewer agents regardless of whether v1 or v2 is larger.
2.5.5 Innite Number of Agents
This paper studies the more realistic nite-agent models, but potential maximization also
applies to innite-agent models. Sandholm (2001, 2009) denes potential games with
continuous player sets and proves that innite-agent potential games are the limits of
convergent sequences of nite-agent potential games. To illustrate, suppose ni is the mass
(instead of the number) of side-i participants in the baseline model. Every subgame is now
an innite-agent potential game with the same potential function (2.3) because




which is analogous to (2.4). Therefore, both frameworks essentially yield the same result.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how potential maximization can resolve the multiplicity of equi-
libria and derive novel insights into two-sided markets. As explained, this renement is
justied by many solid microfoundations in the game theory literature, widely supported
by experimental evidence, and well describes agent behavior in two-sided markets. Further-
more, the paper shows that many two-sided market models are weighted potential games,
and thus we can use the same selection criterion potential maximization for all these
models. Moreover, the predictions under potential maximization match the reality well.
In particular, two-sided platforms often divide and conquer, and the primary determinant
of the divide/conquer side is cross-side network e¤ects. This divide-and-conquer strategy
implies that platforms are often designed to favor the conquer side much more than the
divide side, which is often socially suboptimal. Besides, potential maximization is very
tractable as the paper demonstrates. Given all these advantages, potential maximization
is a very attractive approach to resolve the multiple equilibria issue in two-sided markets.
A natural direction for future research is to analyze other two-sided market models
under potential maximization and discover more novel ndings. In fact, Section 2.5 has
already derived the respective potential functions for various two-sided market models.
One could continue from there to identify the potential maximizer and then characterize
the equilibrium in di¤erent contexts.
Not all two-sided market models are weighted potential games. For example, if agents
can multihome, the model is generally not a weighted potential game. Nevertheless, poten-
tial maximization is not conned to weighted potential games; it also applies to a broader
class of potential games such as monotone potential games.20 Hence, extending potential
maximization to two-sided market models belonging to other classes of potential games is
another fruitful direction for future research.
20Morris and Ui (2005, Section 6) dene monotone potential games. All game-theoretic justications for
potential maximization stated in the Related Literature apply to supermodular monotone potential games.
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Chapter 3
Strong Network E¤ects Eliminate Spence
Distortions
3.1 Introduction
An important contribution of Michael Spence (1975) is his theory of market failure in
quality: when deciding on the level of quality, a prot-maximizing rm only cares about
the (marginal) benet of quality to the marginal consumer whereas a social planner cares
about that to the average consumer. This distortion in quality is now known as the Spence
distortion. In practice, regulators sometimes rectify this distortion through minimum qual-
ity standards and/or other incentive schemes targeting the socially optimal quality level
(Sappington 2005).
In traditional markets, quality refers to product/service characteristics (henceforth in-
trinsic quality). Yet, today we are surrounded by markets with network e¤ects,1 i.e., the
value of the good/service increases with the number of buyers/users. Thus, the number of
buyers is considered as another dimension of quality in these so-called network markets.
A large literature shows that Spence distortions arise on both dimensions of quality in
network markets.2 These papers either assume weak network e¤ects in which there is a
1Network e¤ects arise in all platform markets including social networks (e.g., Facebook), online mar-
ketplaces (e.g., Amazon), and sharing economies (e.g., Airbnb), and in all technical standards including
communication technologies (e.g., Zoom), programming languages (e.g., LATEX), and keyboard designs (e.g.,
QWERTY).
2Lambertini and Orsini (2001) and Veiga (2018) document Spence distortions on intrinsic quality. Katz
and Shapiro (1985) and Wright (2004) mention Spence distortions on the number of buyers; Weyl (2010)
provides an extensive analysis on that. As emphasized by Weyl (p. 1652), This Spence distortion is likely
more important in two-sided markets than the contexts for which it was originally conceived.Jullien (2012),
Rysman and Wright (2014), White and Weyl (2016), and Alexandrov and Spulber (2017) also document
Spence distortions on the number of buyers. Tan and Wright (2018) show that other distortions might
o¤set the Spence distortion on the number of buyers. Veiga et al. (2017) document Spence distortions on
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unique market-sharing equilibrium, or strong network e¤ects in which there are multiple
tipping equilibria and then specify a selection criterion to single out an equilibrium. Under
weak network e¤ects, rms compete for the marginal consumer (who is indi¤erent between
buying from one rm or the other) as in markets without network e¤ects. Thus, when
setting the quality, each rm only cares about the benet to the marginal consumer; Spence
distortions naturally arise in the model. By contrast, under strong network e¤ects, rms
compete in the sense of winner takes all.A classic example is the disc format war between
Blu-ray and HD DVD in 20062008. Sony and Toshiba competed for all consumers to
coordinate on their standards rather than competing for the marginal consumer; in fact,
such a marginal consumer does not even exist. In this spirit, Spence distortions should be
absent. The above argument applies to any number of rms and sides.3
Yet, why is there an extensive literature documenting Spence distortions even under
strong network e¤ects? The crux is the choice of equilibrium selection criterion. In standard
settings, this paper shows that all popular selection criteria in the network economics liter-
ature (namely, Pareto dominance, favorable/unfavorable expectations, coalition-proofness,
and insulating tari¤s) give rise to Spence distortions.4 A follow-up question arises: is there
a selection criterion leading to an alternative (and perhaps more plausible) prediction, in
which Spence distortions are absent under strong network e¤ects? This paper provides a
positive answer: potential maximization.
Potential maximization is a renement of Nash equilibrium in potential games, a concept
introduced by Rosenthal (1973) and formalized by Monderer and Shapley (1996).5 I will
explain both concepts in Section 3.2.4. Under potential maximization and strong network
both dimensions of quality.
3For monopoly markets, the outside option can be viewed as a second rm competing with the
monopolist.
4See, for example, Caillaud and Jullien (2001), Hagiu (2006), and Jullien (2011) for favorable/unfavorable
expectations; Ambrus and Argenziano (2009) for coalition-proofness; Weyl (2010) and White and Weyl
(2016) for insulating tari¤s. Favorable/unfavorable expectations are also called optimistic/pessimistic beliefs
(e.g., Caillaud and Jullien 2003), focality (e.g., Halaburda and Yehezkel 2019), or incumbency advantage
(e.g., Biglaiser et al. 2019).
5This renement is justied by many theoretical and experimental studies; see Chan (2019, Related
Literature) for a summary of established justications.
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e¤ects, consumers coordinate on the less risky equilibrium,6 which in turn depends on
all consumersvaluations. Therefore, when setting the quality, the rm cares about the
benets to all (or average) consumers; the Spence distortion is absent.
Other novel quality distortions may arise under potential maximization. For example,
when deciding on the quality level, the rm cares about reducing consumersoverall co-
ordination risk rather than increasing consumersequilibrium valuations. Therefore, the
rm may oversupply (undersupply) quality relative to the social optimum if the intrinsic
quality and the number of buyers are substitutes (complements) regarding the size of net-
work benets. Another distortion is that the rm cares more about how quality a¤ects
consumers with lower network benets because increasing their valuations substantially
reduces the overall coordination risk. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst
to document these quality distortions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 uses the simplest example to show that
all popular selection criteria in the network economics literature lead to Spence distortions
under strong network e¤ects, whereas potential maximization does not. The model is
naturally extended from Spences (1975) monopoly model,7 in which consumers derive an
additional network benet generated by other buyers. In this example, consumers di¤er
only in their stand-alone benets from buying the network good, and the quality of the good
only a¤ects stand-alone benets. Under potential maximization, the monopolists prot-
maximizing quality level is the social optimum. Section 3.3 generalizes the example such
that consumers di¤er in both their network and stand-alone benets, and the quality of the
good a¤ects both benets. Several novel quality distortions (but not the Spence distortion)
now arise under potential maximization. Section 3.4 slightly modies the model in Section
3.3 by endogenizing the number of potential consumers as the quality of the network
good. I show that the Spence distortion on this dimension of quality is absent only under
6Potential maximization always selects the risk-dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) in
two-player two-action games.
7Spence (1975) analyzes a monopoly model, but his insights carry over to any number of rms. Analo-
gously, for expositional convenience, I analyze a one-sided monopoly model, but my insights carry over to
any number of rms and sides.
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potential maximization. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 An Example
The model in this section is a special case of that in Section 3.3. All the proofs are also
special cases of those in the general model, and therefore I will not repeat in this section.
3.2.1 Model
A monopolist sells a network good to N consumers. Let I  f1; : : : ; Ng denote the set of
consumers. The game has two stages. In stage 1, the monopolist sets price p 2 R+ and
quality q 2 R+. In stage 2, all consumers simultaneously decide whether to buy the good.
Denote ai 2 f0  not buy; 1  buyg as consumer is action, a  (ai)i as the action prole,
and a i  (aj)j 6=i as the action prole except ai. In the context of platform markets, the
monopolist is a platform providing a service, and consumers decide whether to join the
platform. Consumer is payo¤ is
ui(ai = 1;a i; p; q) = v
X
j 6=i
aj + (i; q)  p; ui(ai = 0;a i; p; q) = 0;
where v 2 R++ is the network benet generated by every other buyer and  : IR+ ! R+
measures each consumers stand-alone benet from buying the good. In this example,
consumers di¤er only in their stand-alone benets, and the quality of the good a¤ects
stand-alone benets only. These restrictions are relaxed in Section 3.3. The monopolists
payo¤ is equal to its prot:
(a; p; q) = p
X
i
ai   c(q); (3.1)
where c : R+ ! R+ measures the cost of quality.8 Note that if v = 0 (which I have ruled
out), this example is essentially the Spences (1975) model; see also Sheshinski (1976) for
a similar model.
I make the following assumptions:
8We can easily generalize the cost function to also depend on the number of buyers. All insights remain
intact; see the appendix for details.
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A1. c(q) is increasing, strictly convex, di¤erentiable, limq!0 c0(q) = 0, and limq!1 c0(q) =
1;
A2. for all i 2 I, (i; q) is increasing, concave, and di¤erentiable in q;
A3. for all i 2 f1; : : : ; N   1g and q 2 R+, 0  (i; q)  (i+ 1; q) < v.
A1 and A2 are standard assumptions to guarantee a unique interior solution for both the
socially optimal and equilibrium quality levels in the subsequent analysis. A3 states that
(i) consumers are well-ordered in their stand-alone benets (consumer 1 (N) always values
the good most (least)) and (ii) the network benet v is large relative to the heterogeneity
of consumersstand-alone benets.9
In what follows, I examine the pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of this two-stage
game. Section 3.2.2 denes the social planners problem and derives the socially optimal
quality level. Section 3.2.3 analyzes the game under all popular selection criteria and shows
that the Spence distortion arises in equilibrium. Section 3.2.4 introduces potential games
and potential maximization and shows that the Spence distortion is absent under potential
maximization.
3.2.2 Social Planners Problem
The social planner chooses quality q and all consumerspurchasing decisions a to maximize







aj + (i; q))  c(q):
The rst term is the sum of all consumers benets, and the second term is the cost
of quality. Given the marginal cost of production is zero, the social planner assigns all
9Given any q 2 R+, we can always permute consumers in decreasing order of their stand-alone benets.
Thus, A3 can be relaxed as follows: (i) given any q 2 R+, after the permutation, (i; q)   (i + 1; q) < v
for all i 2 f1; : : : ; N   1g and (ii) for all q 2 R+, N 2 argmin(i; q). The latter guarantees that the Spence
distortion is well-behaved under all popular selection criteria because consumer N is always the marginal
consumer in equilibrium. If we are only interested in potential maximization, the latter can be dropped.
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consumers to buy the good. Thus, social surplus becomes
S(1; q) = vN(N   1) +
X
i
(i; q)  c(q): (3.2)
Under A1 and A2, the unique socially optimal quality level qFB (FB stands for First
Best) is characterized by the rst-order condition of (3.2) as shown below.







In words, the social optimum equates the marginal cost of quality to the sum of all
consumersmarginal values of quality.
3.2.3 Monopolists Problem under All Popular Selection Criteria
I now turn to the monopolists problem. I solve the game backwards, starting from stage
2. Strong network e¤ects often generate multiple equilibria in stage 2. In particular, there
are exactly two pure-strategy Nash equilibria when (1; q)  p  v(N   1) + (N; q):10
(i) all consumers buy the good and (ii) no one buys the good. Clearly, the former Pareto
dominates the latter for all consumers. All popular selection criteria in this literature (i.e.,
Pareto dominance, favorable/unfavorable expectations, coalition-proofness, and insulating
tari¤s; see footnote 4 for examples) except unfavorable expectations select the former
whenever there are multiple equilibria, whereas unfavorable expectations select the latter
instead. I now analyze these two scenarios. For convenience, I call the rst scenario
favorable expectations.
Favorable expectations Under favorable expectations, I prove in the appendix that,
for any quality q chosen by the monopolist, its optimal price is
p(q) = v(N   1) + (N; q):
10The unique (and dominant-solvable) equilibrium is all consumers buying the good when p < (1; q)
and no one buying the good when p > v(N   1) + (N; q). See the appendix for details.
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All consumers buy the good in stage 2, and consumer N the marginal consumer is
indi¤erent between buying or not. Given this optimal pricing strategy, from (3.1), the
monopolists prot is
(1; p(q); q) = vN(N   1) +N(N; q)  c(q):
Under A1 and A2, its unique prot-maximizing quality level q is characterized by the
rst-order condition of the above expression as shown below.






In words, the equilibrium quality level equates the marginal cost of quality with the
marginal value of quality to the marginal consumer multiplied by the number of consumers.
The di¤erence between the social optimum qFB in Lemma 1 and the equilibrium quality
level q in Lemma 2 in such a way is known as the Spence distortion.
Unfavorable expectations Under unfavorable expectations, the monopolist can at
most (and will) charge
p(q) = (1; q); (3.3)
so that all consumers will buy the good in stage 2 for sure.11 No one will buy the good if
it charges a higher price. Hence, from (3.1), its prot becomes
(1; p(q); q) = N(1; q)  c(q): (3.4)
Under A1 and A2, its unique prot-maximizing quality level q is characterized by the
rst-order condition of (3.4) as shown below.
11The unique equilibrium is all consumers buying the good when p < (1; q) as stated in footnote 10.
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Similar but distinct from the Spence distortion under favorable expectations as shown
in Lemma 2, the monopolist now only cares about the benet of quality to the consumer
with the highest valuation (i.e. consumer 1) under unfavorable expectations.
3.2.4 Monopolists Problem under Potential Maximization
Now, I rst introduce potential games and potential maximization, and then I will analyze
the game under potential maximization. A game is called a potential game if it admits a
potential function, which summarizes all consumersstrategic considerations. Consider the
following function















Given any price p and quality q, we can easily verify that for all i 2 I and a i 2 f0; 1gN 1,
ui(ai = 1;a i; p; q)  ui(ai = 0;a i; p; q) = (ai = 1;a i; p; q)  (ai = 0;a i; p; q): (3.6)
In words, xing othersactions a i, the payo¤ di¤erence between buying the good or not
for each agent is equal to the corresponding di¤erence in . Such a function  is called a
potential function. Hence, every subgame with (p; q) set by the monopolist in stage 1 is a
potential game.
The maximizer of the potential function (i.e., maxa(a; p; q); also called the potential
maximizer) always exists and is generically unique. Furthermore, the potential maximizer
is a Nash equilibrium: if someone deviates from the potential maximizer, the potential will
decrease, and, by (3.6), the deviator will have a lower payo¤. Hence, if there is a unique
equilibrium in a potential game, the potential maximizer is the unique equilibrium; if there
are multiple equilibria, the potential maximizer is the one with the highest potential. More-
over, as stated in footnote 5, many theoretical and experimental studies nd that players
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often coordinate on the potential maximizer. Therefore, the potential maximizer renes
Nash equilibrium in potential games, and this renement is called potential maximization.
I now analyze the game under potential maximization. As stated on p. 52, there are
two equilibria in stage 2 when (1; q)  p  v(N   1) + (N; q). By (3.5), their respective
potentials are
(1; p; q) =
v
2
N(N   1) +
X
i
(i; q)  pN; (0; p; q) = 0:
Clearly, the potential maximizer is all consumers buying the good if and only if p 
v




i (i; q) for these subgames. The following lemma shows that this nding
holds for all subgames.
Lemma 4 The potential maximizer of the subgame is all consumers buying the good if




i (i; q) and no one buying the good otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix.
As shown in Lemma 4, the monopolist has to leave enough consumer surplus by setting
su¢ ciently low price p and/or high quality q in stage 1 so that all consumers will buy the










Given this optimal pricing strategy, from (3.1), its prot is
(1; p(q); q) =
v
2




Observe that this prot function is identical to the social surplus (3.2) except the network
benet v is now halved. Therefore, the monopolists choice of quality is the same as that
of a social planner, and it is summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Under potential maximization, the equilibrium quality level is socially op-
timal: the Spence distortion is absent.
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In this example, the monopolist chooses the socially optimal quality level in equilibrium.
This implies that regulating the monopolist can only reduce social surplus. Nevertheless,
this implication may not hold when we generalize the model in Section 3.3. In the general
model, some novel quality distortions (but not the Spence distortion) may arise under po-
tential maximization. To the best of my knowledge, these distortions are never documented
in the literature.
3.3 Generalization
In the previous section, consumers di¤er only in their stand-alone benets, and the quality
of the good only a¤ects stand-alone benets. This section relaxes these restrictions and
analyzes a broader class of payo¤ functions.
3.3.1 Model
The model is identical to the previous one except the payo¤ of consumer i from buying the
good is now
ui(ai = 1;a i; p; q) = v(i; q)  (
X
j
aj ; q) + (i; q)  p;
where  : I  R+ ! R+ is the network-benet function and v : I  R+ ! R++ measures
each consumers valuation of the network benet. Consumers now di¤er in two aspects:
(i) their network-benet valuations v and (ii) their stand-alone benets . Quality now
a¤ects their payo¤s in three aspects: (i) their network-benet valuations v, (ii) the network-
benet function , and (iii) their stand-alone benets . Clearly, the previous example is
a special case with v(i; q) = v and (
P
j aj ; q) =
P
j aj   1 =
P
j 6=i aj . In the appendix, I
further generalize the model with multidimensional quality and a general cost function for
the monopolist that also depends on the number of buyers. All insights developed in this
section carry over to this even more general framework.
I make the following assumptions. These assumptions boil down to A1A3 when
v(i; q) = v and (
P
j aj ; q) =
P
j aj   1.
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B1. c(q) is increasing, su¢ ciently convex, di¤erentiable, and limq!0 c0(q) = 0;
B2. for all i 2 I, v(i; q), (i; q), and (i; q) are increasing and di¤erentiable in q;
B3. for all q 2 R+, v(i; q) and (i; q) are decreasing in i;
B4. for all q 2 R+, (1; q) = 0 and v(i; q)(i; q) + (i; q) is strictly increasing in i.
B1 and B2 guarantee a unique interior solution for both the socially optimal and equi-
librium quality levels. B3 states that consumers are well-ordered on both their network
and stand-alone benets.12 B4 states that (i) the network benet, by denition, is zero
when there is only one buyer and (ii) the marginal network benet of additional buyers is
large relative to the heterogeneity of consumersvaluations.
Similar to Section 3.2, Section 3.3.2 derives the socially optimal quality level. Section
3.3.3 analyzes the game under all popular selection criteria and shows that Spence distor-
tions arise in equilibrium. Section 3.3.4 shows that Spence distortions are absent but other
quality distortions arise under potential maximization.
3.3.2 Social Planners Problem







aj ; q) + (i; q)]  c(q):
Given the marginal cost of production is zero, the social planner assigns all consumers to




v(i; q)(N; q) +
X
i
(i; q)  c(q): (3.7)
12Similar to Section 3.2 (see also footnote 9), consumers need not be well-ordered (i.e., B3 can be relaxed)
as long as the marginal network benet is su¢ ciently large (i.e., by strengthening B4). Precisely, we can
replace B3 and B4 with the following assumption: for all n 2 f1; : : : ; N   1g and q 2 R+, (1; q) = 0 and
maxi fv(i; q)(n; q) + (i; q)g < mini fv(i; q)(n+ 1; q) + (i; q)g. To guarantee that Spence distortions
are well-behaved under favorable expectations, we need an additional assumption: for all q 2 R+, N 2
argmini fv(i; q)(N; q) + (i; q)g.
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Under B1 and B2, the unique socially optimal quality level qFB is characterized by the
rst-order condition of (3.7) as shown below.
Lemma 5 The socially optimal quality level qFB is uniquely given by

















As in Section 3.2.2, the social optimum equates the marginal cost of quality with the
sum of the marginal values of quality for all consumers.
3.3.3 Monopolists Problem under All Popular Selection Criteria
I now analyze the monopolists problem. There are two equilibria in stage 2 when (1; q) 
p  v(N; q)(N; q) + (N; q):13 (i) all consumers buy the good and (ii) no one buys the
good. Similar to Section 3.2.3, I analyze the game under both favorable and unfavorable
expectations.
Favorable expectations Under favorable expectations, I prove in the appendix that,
for any quality q chosen by the monopolist, its optimal price is
p(q) = v(N; q) (N; q) + (N; q): (3.8)
All consumers buy the good in stage 2, and the marginal consumer N is indi¤erent between
buying or not. Given this optimal pricing strategy, from (3.1), its prot is
(1; p(q); q) = Nv(N; q) (N; q) +N(N; q)  c(q): (3.9)
Under B1 and B2, its unique prot-maximizing quality level q is characterized by the
rst-order condition of (3.9) as shown below.
13The unique (and dominant-solvable) equilibrium is all consumers buying the good when p < (1; q)
and no one buying the good when p > v(N; q)(N; q) + (N; q). See the appendix for details.
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Lemma 6 Under favorable expectations, the equilibrium quality level q is uniquely given
by













In contrast to the social optimum in Lemma 5, the equilibrium quality level equates
the marginal cost of quality with the marginal value of quality to the marginal consumer
multiplied by the number of consumers. Spence distortions arise under favorable expecta-
tions.
Unfavorable expectations Under unfavorable expectations, it is easy to see that the
monopolists optimal pricing strategy is given by (3.3), i.e., the same price as in Section
3.2.3. It is because the monopolist cannot internalize any network benets under unfa-
vorable expectations, and therefore the generalizations in this section play no role in this
scenario. All subsequent analysis follows.
3.3.4 Monopolists Problem under Potential Maximization
Similar to Section 3.2.4, consider the following function
















Given any p and q, we can verify that for all i and a i,
ui(ai = 1;a i; p; q)  ui(ai = 0;a i; p; q) = v(i; q)[(ai = 1;a i; p; q) (ai = 0;a i; p; q)]:
In other words, the payo¤ di¤erence between buying the good or not for each agent is
proportional to the corresponding di¤erence in . Every subgame is now called a weighted
potential game (if the proportion is one for all consumers as in (3.6), then it is called an
exact potential game). Nevertheless, the potential function  preserves all the properties
stated in Section 3.2.4. The potential maximizer of each subgame is given as follows.
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Lemma 7 The potential maximizer of the subgame is all consumers buying the good if
p 
P









and no one buying the good otherwise.
Proof. See the appendix.
As shown in Lemma 7, the monopolist has to leave enough surplus to consumers so
that all of them will buy the good. Therefore, it optimally sets the highest possible price
until the constraint in (3.11) binds. By rearranging the terms, its optimal pricing strategy
is characterized as follows.





























In contrast to the equilibrium price under favorable expectations (3.8) or unfavorable
expectations (3.3), the price now depends on all consumersvaluations but not that of a
single consumer. Clearly, Spence distortions will not arise in equilibrium. Nevertheless,
other quality distortions will arise. Note that the monopolists equilibrium price (and thus
its prot-maximizing quality level) depends on consumersoverall coordination risk, which
in turn depends on the three terms comprising p(q) in Proposition 2. These three terms
are the sources of quality distortions in the subsequent analysis. The larger these terms,
the lower the coordination risk, and thus the more the monopolist can charge consumers.
I now discuss these three terms one by one.













Compared to the arithmetic mean, the harmonic mean alleviates the impact of large outliers
and exacerbates that of small ones. Also, it is always less than the arithmetic mean and
decreases with a mean-preserving spread. In other words, the monopolist internalizes only
part of consumersnetwork-benet valuations; the more dispersed their network-benet
valuations, the less surplus the monopolist can extract.
Incremental benet The second term 1N
P
i (i; q) is called the incremental (network)
benet as suggested by its form. Under potential maximization, all consumers will buy the
good in equilibrium, and therefore the equilibrium network benet is (N; q). However, the
monopolist internalizes only part of the network benet. For a xed equilibrium network
benet (N; q), a larger incremental benet implies a lower overall coordination risk,14 and
thus the monopolist can charge consumers more.
Bias weights The last term is a weighted average of consumersstand-alone benets.
Consumers with lower network-benet valuations relatively care more about the stand-
alone benet from buying the good. Thus, the stand-alone benets of these consumers
are relatively more important regarding the overall coordination risk. When consumers
with lower network-benet valuations also have lower (higher) stand-alone benets, it is
more (less) di¢ cult for all consumers to coordinate on buying the good, and thus the
monopolists equilibrium price is lower (higher).
Given the monopolists optimal pricing strategy in Proposition 2, from (3.1), its prot
is




















(i; q)  c(q): (3.13)
This prot function di¤ers from the social surplus (3.7) in three aspects:
14When the incremental benet is large, even if only some (but not all) consumers buy the good, the
network benet is still large, i.e., the cost of miscoordination is small.
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1. the sum of consumersnetwork-benet valuations
P
i v(i; q) is replaced by the har-
monic mean of the valuations H(vjq) multiplied by the number of consumers N ;





3. the sum of consumersstand-alone benets
P
i (i; q) is replaced by a weighted sum
of the benets.
These three di¤erences lead to various quality distortions (but not Spence distortions).
Under B1 and B2, the monopolists unique prot-maximizing quality level q is character-
ized by the rst-order condition of (3.13) as shown below.






























































Compared to the social optimum in Lemma 5, there are several quality distortions
a¤ecting consumersvaluations for (i) the network benet, (ii) the network-benet function,
and (iii) consumersstand-alone benets. I now discuss them one by one, starting from
the last one to the rst one.
Stand-alone benets The distortion a¤ecting stand-alone benets is called the bias-
weights distortion (). As its name suggests, the monopolist assigns higher weights to
consumers with lower network-benet valuations because these consumers stand-alone
benets are relatively more important regarding the overall coordination risk the same
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reason we have discussed previously on the bias weights of the monopolists equilibrium
price. If the quality of the good only a¤ects stand-alone benets and consumers have the
same network-benet valuation (as in Section 3.2), the equilibrium quality level is socially
optimal (as shown in Proposition 1).
Network-benet function There are two distortions a¤ecting the network-benet func-
tion. The rst one is called the harmonic-mean distortion. As shown in Proposition 2, the
monopolists equilibrium price increases linearly with H(vjq) (the harmonic mean), which
is less than 1N
P
i v(i; q) (the arithmetic mean) as explained before. Therefore, the mo-
nopolist internalizes only part of consumersnetwork-benet valuations, giving it too little
incentive to increase the network-benet function by investing in quality. The second dis-
tortion is called the marginal-incremental-benet distortion. As shown in Proposition 2, the
monopolists equilibrium price increases linearly with the incremental benet 1N
P
i (i; q).
Therefore, when setting the quality, the monopolist cares about increasing the incremental
benet rather than increasing the equilibrium network benet (N; q). Thus, the monopo-
list tends to oversupply (undersupply) quality if the quality and the number of buyers are
substitutes (complements) regarding the network benet, i.e., if @(i;q)@q decreases (increases)
with i.
Network-benet valuations There are two distortions a¤ecting consumersvaluations
for the network benet. The rst one is called the adjusted-incremental-benet distortion.15
The term p(q)   (i; q) is consumer is net stand-alone cost from buying the good, and
v(i; q)(N; q) is his network benet if all consumers successfully coordinate on buying
the good. Hence, p
(q) (i;q)
v(i;q)(N;q) can be viewed as the cost-benet ratio from taking his risky
action (i.e., buying the good). Clearly, all consumersratios (and thus the weighted average
15As we will see shortly in Corollary 2, this distortion is simplied to 1
N
P
i (i; q) (called the incremental-
benet distortion) when consumers have the same network-benet valuation. Therefore, the current dis-











v(i;q)(N;q) ) are positive and smaller than one,
16 indicating the
monopolists insu¢ cient incentive to increase consumers network-benet valuations by
investing in quality. The second distortion is called the bias-weights distortion (v). As its
name suggests, the monopolist assigns higher weights to consumers with higher cost-benet
ratios p
(q) (i;q)
v(i;q)(N;q) and/or lower network-benet valuations v(i; q) because increasing their
v(i; q) substantially reduces the overall coordination risk.17
Proposition 3 identies ve quality distortions under potential maximization. Both the
adjusted-incremental-benet and harmonic-mean distortions put downward pressures on
the equilibrium quality level, while that of the marginal-incremental-benet distortion is
upward (downward) when i and q are substitutes (complements) in the network-benet
function (i; q). The e¤ects of the two bias-weights distortions are ambiguous. Neverthe-
less, they are more likely to be downward rather than upward pressures because consumers
who value the good less are usually less sensitive to the marginal benet of quality. Over-
all speaking, the monopolist is more likely to undersupply rather than oversupply quality
relative to the social optimum.
This section analyzes the general model in which consumers are heterogeneous in two
aspects (v and ) and the quality a¤ects their payo¤s in three aspects (v, , and ). For
a specic network market, only some of these aspects are relevant and important, and
thus only some of the ve distortions will arise. I conclude this section with two corol-
laries characterizing the distortions for two special cases of interest: (i) (i; q) = 0 and
(ii) v(i; q) = v(q) for all i 2 I. The former ts network markets that create value primar-
ily by enabling interactions among users (e.g., telecommunications and social networks).
16 In the appendix, I prove that (1; q) < p(q) < v(N; q)(N; q) + (N; q), which (together with B3)
implies all consumersratios are positive and smaller than one. Intuitively, if the ratio is negative (larger
than one) for a consumer, he has a dominant (dominated) strategy to buy the good, which contradicts our
equilibrium analysis.
17Consumers with higher cost-benet ratios are less willing to take their risky actions (i.e., buying the
good), and thus increasing their v(i; q) makes it much easier for all consumers to coordinate on buying
the good. For consumers with lower network-benet valuations, increasing their v(i; q) substantially in-
creases the monopolists equilibrium price (which increases linearly with H(vjq)) because the harmonic
mean exacerbates the impact of small outliers as explained before.
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The latter does not perfectly t most of the markets that come to mind, but it substan-
tially simplies the distortions because the complexity due to the harmonic mean of v(i; q)
disappears.
Corollary 1 When (i; q) = 0 for all i 2 I, the equilibrium quality level q under potential



































@q| {z } :
marginal-incremental-benet distortion
When there are no stand-alone benets, the distortions a¤ecting the network-benet
function remain intact, and the term for the bias-weights distortion (v) is simplied.
The adjusted-incremental-benet distortion now breaks into two distortions: the disper-










 1jq))2 denote the arithmetic mean and the variance of
1
v(i;q) respectively. As shown in Corollary 1, the dispersion distortion puts an upward
pressure on quality, and it increases with the mean-preserving spread of 1v(i;q) . Thus, the
dispersion distortion counteracts the harmonic-mean distortion: the former increases with
the dispersion of consumers network-benet valuations, while the latter decreases with
it. On the other hand, the incremental-benet distortion puts a downward pressure on
quality because the incremental network benet 1N
P
i (i; q) is less than the equilibrium
network benet (N; q). Given that the dispersion and incremental-benet distortions con-
stitute the adjusted-incremental-benet distortion, their net e¤ect is a downward pressure
on quality.
Corollary 2 When v(i; q) = v(q) for all i 2 I, the equilibrium quality level q under
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When consumers have the same network-benet valuation, the two bias-weights and
harmonic-mean distortions disappear. The marginal-incremental-benet distortion remains
intact, and the adjusted-incremental-benet distortion is simplied to the incremental-
benet distortion.
As shown in Proposition 3 and Corollaries 1 and 2, quality distortions caused by the
incremental benet are robust to the heterogeneity of consumersvaluations. This suggests
that when setting policies and regulations for network markets, arguments based on these
distortions are often valid, whereas those for other distortions (especially the two bias-
weights distortions) require considerable knowledge of consumerspreferences.
3.4 Number of Buyers as Quality
The previous sections strictly follow Spences (1975) model in which the monopolist sets
both price p and quality q. As mentioned in the Introduction, the number of buyers/users
is considered as another dimension of quality in network markets, and the Spence distor-
tion on this dimension is also widely documented in the literature (see footnote 2). As
emphasized by Weyl (2010, p. 1652), This Spence distortion is likely more important in
two-sided markets than the contexts for which it was originally conceived.At this point, it
should be apparent that strong network e¤ects will eliminate this Spence distortion under
potential maximization for the same reason as before. This section formally proves this
result by slightly modifying the model in Section 3.3 and derives further implications.
3.4.1 Model
In the previous model, the number of consumers is xed at N . This section endogenizes
the number of consumers, which serves as the quality of the network good. Precisely,
67
I add an additional stage (stage 0) in the beginning of the game where the monopolist
chooses the number of consumers N 2 Z+ through some costly e¤orts.18 These e¤orts
include promotion and advertising e¤orts, and expanding demographic and geographic
market coverage. For expositional convenience, I remove the intrinsic quality q from the
model. The monopolists payo¤ is now




where c : Z+ ! R+ measures the cost.
I replace B1 and B2 with the following assumption:
C1. c(N) is increasing, su¢ ciently convex, and c(0) = c(1).
C1 and B4 guarantee a unique interior solution for both the socially optimal and equi-
librium numbers of consumers in the subsequent analysis. B3 is a natural assumption in
the current setting because consumers who value the good more are often better informed
about the existence of the good.
3.4.2 Analysis
Every subgame in stage 1 is equivalent to the model in Section 3.3 after replacing c(q) with
c(N) and removing q from the model. Hence, we can immediately characterize the social
surplus (3.7) and the monopolists prot under favorable expectations (3.9), unfavorable
expectations (3.4), and potential maximization (3.13) for the subgames in stage 1.
In stage 0, the social planner and the monopolist choose the number of consumers N
(eventually all of them become buyers) to maximize social surplus and prot respectively.
Under C1 and B4, the solutions are uniquely characterized by the rst-order conditions
with respect to N of the respective functions. For expositional convenience, the following
proposition characterizes the solutions by ignoring the integer constraint of N , replac-
18An equivalent timing is that the monopolist chooses both the price p and the number of consumers N






0 , and assuming di¤erentiability of the respective
functions. In the appendix, I characterize the integer solutions of N .
Proposition 4 By ignoring the integer constraint of N , replacing summations with inte-
grals, and assuming c(N), v(i), (i), and (i) are di¤erentiable,
(a) the socially optimal number of consumers NFB is uniquely given by








marginal benets to others
(b) the equilibrium number of consumers N under favorable expectations is uniquely
given by




N((N)v0(N) + 0(N))| {z };
market power distortion
(c) the equilibrium number of consumers N under unfavorable expectations is uniquely
given by
c0(N) = (1);



















As shown in Proposition 4, the socially optimal number of consumers equates the
marginal cost with the marginal consumers benet plus the marginal network benets to
all other consumers. Compared to the social optimum, there are two distortions under
favorable expectations. The rst distortion is the classical market power distortion, in
which the monopolists marginal revenue falls short of its price. The second distortion


















) are the respective counterparts






















is the Spence distortion, in which the monopolist internalizes the network benet of the
marginal instead of the average consumer. Under B3, both distortions put downward
pressures on the equilibrium number of consumers. Hence, the monopolist attracts too
few buyers relative to the social optimum. The equilibrium number of consumers under
unfavorable expectations is uninteresting, which I will not discuss.
Under potential maximization, the monopolist extracts only part of the marginal con-
sumers surplus because v(N)(N) + (N) > p(N) (see footnote 16). Nevertheless,
it extracts additional surplus from all other consumers due to the network benets gener-
ated by the marginal consumer. Under B3 (which implies H(vjN)  v(N)), the sum of
these two surpluses exceeds the marginal consumers benet. The monopolist may attract
too many or too few buyers relative to the social optimum. The former occurs when the
marginal network benet 0(NFB) to other consumers (evaluated at the social optimum)
is su¢ ciently small, whereas the latter occurs when (i) consumers do not di¤er too much in
their network-benet valuations (which implies H(vjN)  v(N)) and/or (ii) the marginal
consumers valuation is su¢ ciently low, i.e., v(N)(N) + (N)  p(N).
This section shows that all popular selection criteria (except unfavorable expectations)
in the network economics literature give rise to the Spence distortion on the number of
buyers/users, whereas potential maximization does not. Under favorable expectations, the
monopolist attracts too few buyers relative to the social optimum due to both the market
power and Spence distortions. By contrast, the monopolist may attract too many or too
few buyers under potential maximization, and I have identied the key determinants.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper questions the existence of Spence distortions under strong network e¤ects from
both conceptual and theoretical perspectives. Under potential maximization, a renement
of Nash equilibrium justied by many solid microfoundations and experimental evidence,
Spence distortions are absent in equilibrium. This nding has important policy implications
for network markets. In these markets, the sources of market failure in quality (if any)
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might be those novel distortions identied in this paper but not Spence distortions. This
suggests that regulations on network markets based on Spence distortion arguments might
be socially suboptimal or even welfare-reducing.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
Proof of Lemma 1 For all p 2 P , i 2 N , and x 2 X,
ui(x)  pi(xi) = wi(x) + i(x i)  pi(xi) (by A1 and (1.2))





+ i(x i) (by (1.5))










Proof of Lemma 2 It follows from the discussion in the text.
Proof of Lemma 3 It follows from the discussion in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1 The target action prole x̂ is xed throughout the proof. For
notational convenience, the optimal contracts (1.10) include all agents, but only those with
x̂i 6= oi (i.e., belonging to N̂) matter in the linear program (1.9); see also footnote 14.
Without loss of generality, assume N̂ = f1; : : : ; jN̂ jg and w1      wjN̂ j.
To prove this proposition, I rst introduce some notation. Recall from p. 8 that C is
symmetric. Therefore, agents can be partitioned into several groups so that for any two
group members i and j, there exist mutual group members k1; : : : ; kn 2 N̂ (n  0) such
that x̂j Cx̂k1 Cx̂k2 C    Cx̂kn Cx̂i.1 Let Gi  N̂ denote the set of agent is group members
together with agent i himself. Clearly, Gi = Gj for all j 2 Gi. A3 implies x̂jCx̂i for all
j 2 Ginfig. A2 implies x̂jSx̂i for all j =2 Gi. For notational convenience, deneHi  N̂nGi,
1 In graph theory terms, each vertex represents an agent, and agents i and j are linked i¤ x̂j Cx̂i. Every
undirected graph can be decomposed into several connected components, which are the groups I have
described.
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~ : 2N̂ ! R where ~(Z) = (x) with xi = x̂i if i 2 Z (Z  N̂) and xi = oi otherwise, and
~ui : 2
N̂ ! R is dened analogously. We can easily show that A1 and the above derived
properties imply the following:
B1. for all i 2 N̂ and Z  N̂nfig, ~ui(Z [ fig)  ~ui(Z) = wi[~(Z [ fig)  ~(Z)], and
B2. for all i 2 N̂ , ~(G[H [ fig)  ~(G[H) is increasing in G  Ginfig and decreasing
in H  Hi.










 ~(N̂)  ~(N̂nZ) for all Z  N̂ : (A.1)
The contracts (1.10) are re-expressed as
p̂i = ~ui(f1; : : : ; ig [Hi)  ~ui(f1; : : : ; i  1g [Hi) for all i 2 N̂ : (A.2)
The rest of the linear programming proof consists of three steps. First, I show that p̂ 
(p̂i )i2N̂ is feasible. Next, I show that p̂
 is optimal. Last, I show that p̂ is the unique
optimal solution if w1 <    < wjN̂ j.
Feasibility For p̂ to be feasible, we need to show
X
i2Z
~ui(f1; : : : ; ig [Hi)  ~ui(f1; : : : ; i  1g [Hi)
wi
 ~(N̂)  ~(N̂nZ) for all Z  N̂ :
By B1, the above inequalities become
X
i2Z
[~(f1; : : : ; ig [Hi)  ~(f1; : : : ; i  1g [Hi)]  ~(N̂)  ~(N̂nZ) for all Z  N̂ :
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Note that any set Z  N̂ takes the form of fi1; : : : ; ing where i1; : : : ; in 2 N̂ and i1 <    <
in (n  jN̂ j). Thus, the respective inequality for the set Z = fi1; : : : ; ing is re-expressed as
nX
m=1




[~(N̂nfim+1; : : : ; ing)  ~(N̂nfim; : : : ; ing)]:
For the above inequality to hold, it su¢ ces to show that for all m = 1; : : : ; n,
~(f1; : : : ; im   1g [Him [ fimg)  ~(f1; : : : ; im   1g [Him)
 ~(N̂nfim; : : : ; ing [ fimg)  ~(N̂nfim; : : : ; ing):
Observe that f1; : : : ; im  1g [Him = (Gim \ f1; : : : ; im  1g)[Him and N̂nfim; : : : ; ing =
(Gimnfim; : : : ; ing)[ (Himnfim; : : : ; ing). Hence, the above inequality holds by B2 because
Gim \ f1; : : : ; im   1g  Gimnfim; : : : ; ing and Himnfim; : : : ; ing  Him .
Optimality The proof of the optimality of p̂ consists of three steps. First, I derive the
dual problem of (A.1). Next, I construct a feasible solution  to the dual. Last, I show
that the objective function value of the dual at  is equal to that of the primal at p̂. The
weak duality theorem states that the objective function value of the dual at any feasible
solution is weakly greater than that of the primal at any feasible solution. This implies p̂
is optimal for the primal.








(Z) = wi for all i 2 N̂ :
Dene w0  0, i0  maxfj 2 Gi[f0gjj < ig, and   ((Z))ZN̂ where 
(Z) = wi wi0
if Z = Gi \ fi; i+1; : : : ; jN̂ jg (i 2 N̂) and (Z) = 0 otherwise. The solution  is feasible
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= wi   wi0 +
X
i0j2Gi0
(wj   wj0) (Gi = Gi0)
= wi   wi0 + wi0   wi00 +      w0 = wi   w0 = wi:
Denote G 
S





































































[~ui(f1; : : : ; ig [Hi)  ~ui(f1; : : : ; i  1g [Hi)] =
X
i2N̂
p̂i ; (by B1 and (A.2))
which is equal to the objective function value of the primal at p̂.
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(and thus p̂) to be the unique optimal solution, the necessary and su¢ -
cient condition provided by Mangasarian (1979, Theorem 1) is that ~p remains optimal for
all linear programs obtained from (A.3) by an arbitrary but su¢ ciently small perturbation
of the (cost) vector (wi)i2N̂ . This condition is satised if w1 <    < wjN̂j because any
su¢ ciently small perturbation does not alter the ranking of wi and, therefore, ~p remains
optimal.
Proof of Corollary 1 It is a direct implication of Proposition 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 It remains to prove the only ifpart by contrapositive. Consider
a two-agent game with X1 = X2 = f0; 1g (oi = 0), u1(x) = u2(x) = 1 if x = (1; 1) and
u1(x) = u2(x) = 0 otherwise, and U(x; p1(x1) + p2(x2)) = V (x) + p1(x1) + p2(x2) where
V (1; 0) = V (0; 1) = 1 and V (0; 0) = V (1; 1) = 0. Clearly, u1 and u2 satisfy C1 (which
implies A2 and A3); they also satisfy A1 with w1 = w2 = 1 and  = u1 = u2. For
notational convenience, denote p1  p1(1) and p2  p2(1).
There are exactly three types of contracts (p1; p2) leading to multiple equilibria in
stage 2: (i) pi  0 and pj = 1 (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j), (ii) pi  1 and pj = 0, and (iii)
(p1; p2) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1]. For the rst type, there is a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria
in which xi = 1 with probability 1 and xj = 1 with any probability. Similarly, for the second
type, there is a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria in which xi = 0 with probability
1 and xj = 1 with any probability. For the third type, there are three equilibria: (i)
x = (1; 1), (ii) x = (0; 0), and (iii) the mixed-strategy equilibrium in which xi = 1 with
probability pj .
For the rst (second) type, all equilibria have the same potential of  pi (0). Recall
from p. 11 that the principal can select among potential maximizers under potential
76
maximization. Therefore, she can always select the equilibrium giving her the highest
payo¤ for both types.2 For the third type, we can easily show that the principals expected
payo¤s in those three equilibria are p1 + p2, 0, and p1 + p2 respectively, and the potential
maximizer is x = (1; 1) if p1 + p2  1 and x = (0; 0) if p1 + p2  1. Observe that potential
maximization selects the equilibrium giving the principal the highest payo¤ if and only if
p1 + p2  1.
If the underlying equilibrium selection criterion is not more pessimistic than potential
maximization, there exists a non-empty subset of the third type of contracts P  f(p1; p2) 2
(0; 1]  (0; 1]jp1 + p2 > 1g in which either x = (1; 1) or the mixed-strategy equilibrium is
selected; both give the principal the same expected payo¤ of p1 + p2 > 1. If instead the
principal o¤ers the w-DC contracts, the optimal action proles are (1; 1), (1; 0), and (0; 1)
by Corollary 2; in either case, her payo¤ is only 1.
Proof of Corollary 2 It follows from the discussion in the text.
Proof of Corollary 3 It follows from the discussion in the text.




















































2For the rst type, all equilibria give her the same expected payo¤ of 1 + pi. For the second type, the
pure-strategy equilibrium in which xi = 0 and xj = 1 gives her the highest payo¤ of 1.
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Proof of Corollary 4 It is a direct application of Theorem 1, Corollary 1, and Lemma
4.




















Proof of Corollary 5 It is a direct application of Theorem 1 and Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 6 For all i 2 N and x 2 X,

























































































= ui(x)  0i(x i), where
















Proof of Corollary 6 It is a direct application of Theorem 1, Corollary 1, and Lemma
6.
Generic Uniqueness of the Weighted Potential Maximizer
Suppose a game G  (N;X;u) is a weighted potential game. Given a potential function
 (together with a weight vector w 2 RN++) of G, it is clear that the maximizer of  is
generically unique. However, it is unclear whether another potential function 0 (together
with another weight vector w0 2 RN++) of G has the same maximizer(s). Therefore, the
exact statement to prove is as follows. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst
to give a direct proof of this statement.
Lemma 0 The set of potential maximizers of a weighted potential game is independent of
the choice of the potential function.
Proof. Suppose (w;) and (w0;0) are two choices of weight-potential pairs. By
the denition of weighted potential games (A1), for all i 2 N , xi; x0i 2 Xi, and x i 2 X i,
ui(xi;x i) ui(x0i;x i) = wi[(xi;x i) (x0i;x i)] = w0i[0(xi;x i) 0(x0i;x i)]: (A.4)




. Clearly, ~wi > 0 for all i. Without loss of generality, assume ~w1     
~wN . It remains to show that x 2 argmaxx2X 0(x) implies x 2 argmaxx2X (x). To see
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0(x1; : : : ; xi; xi+1; : : : ; xN )  0(x1; : : : ; xi 1; xi; : : : ; xN )]
+ ~wN 1[





0(x1; : : : ; xi; xi+1; : : : ; xN )  0(x1; : : : ; xi 1; xi; : : : ; xN )]
+ ~wN 1[





0(x1; : : : ; xi; xi+1; : : : ; xN )  0(x1; : : : ; xi 1; xi; : : : ; xN )]
+ ~wN 2[
0(x)  0(x1; : : : ; xN 2; xN 1; xN )]





Appendix for Chapter 2
Alternative Pricing Instruments
For the ve examples mentioned on p. 26, nightclubs, shopping malls, and open access jour-
nals charge subscription fees, whereas credit cards and daily deal sites charge transaction
fees. I now modify the model in Section 2.3 to study the latter.
Model If a side-i agent joins platform m, he now pays a transaction fee pmi 2 R per each
interaction with side-j agents who the same platform. Thus, his respective payo¤s from
joining A and B are
uAi (nj ; p
A
i ) = (v
A
i   pAi )nj ; uBi (nj ; pBi ) = (vBi   pBi )(Nj   nj):1 (B.1)


















2 )(N1   n1)(N2   n2):
I assume neither platform uses weakly dominated strategies, i.e., the sum of transaction
fees on both sides pm1 +p
m
2 is non-negative. The rest of the model setup is the same as that
of the subscription model.
Analysis There are two equilibria in stage 2 when pmi  vmi for all i;m:2 (i) all agents
join A and (ii) all agents join B. Both Pareto dominance and Pareto-dominated selection
1Note that there is a one-to-one mapping between transaction fees and revenue sharing, in which platform
A (similarly for B) charges side i a rate of rAi 2 R and uAi (nj ; rAi ) = (1  rAi )vAi nj .





are inapplicable for the same reason as before, whereas potential maximization remains
applicable. Observe that agentspayo¤s (B.1) in the current model can be obtained by
replacing vmi and p
m
i in (2.5) with v
m
i  pmi and 0 respectively. Thus, every subgame of this
model is a weighted potential game, and we can immediately characterize the potential
maximizer by applying the above replacements to Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 When pmi  vmi for all i = 1; 2 and m = A;B, the potential maximizer is all
agents joining platform A if (vA1   pA1 )(vA2   pA2 )  (vB1   pB1 )(vB2   pB2 ) and all agents
joining platform B otherwise.
As shown in Lemma 3, under potential maximization, all agents coordinate on the
platform with the higher value of (vm1   pm1 )(vm2   pm2 ). Hence, stage 1 is analogous to
standard Bertrand competition as in the subscription model. Generically and w.l.o.g.,
assume A (B) is the dominant (dominated) platform in equilibrium. The standard analysis
of Bertrand competition implies thatB sets the minimum prices to maximize (vB1  pB1 )(vB2  
pB2 ) and A slightly undercuts B to capture the entire market. Under the non-negative prot
constraint pB1 +p
B
2  0, Bs equilibrium prices are pB1 = 12(v
B
1  vB2 ) and pB2 = 12(v
B
2  vB1 ).
Hence, from Lemma 3, As equilibrium prices satisfy


















Under the constraint pA1 + p
A
2  0, it is easy to see that A can successfully undercut B if














2 . Thus, A maximizes





2 )N1N2 s.t. (v
A








Solving the above problem gives us platform As optimal pricing strategy.






























All agents join platform A in stage 2, and As equilibrium prot is given by A = 
vA1 + v
A
2   vB1   vB2

N1N2:
Discussion In contrast to the subscription model, the market now tips to the platform
with the higher sum of per-interaction benets vm1 + v
m
2 instead of the product of them
vm1 v
m
2 . Therefore, for these two models, the dominant platform may di¤er even with the
same set of parameter values. Take (2.8) as an example: the dominant platform is A in
the subscription model but B in this model. Following Section 2.3.3, I discuss the three
key implications under the current framework.
Divide and Conquer As shown in Proposition 4, the dominated platform (B) rebal-
ances the net per-interaction benets vBi  pBi of the two sides by charging the side with the





2 ) on both sides. Similarly, the dominant platform (A) adjusts the net
per-interaction benets vAi   pAi of the two sides so that the resulting net per-interaction




2 ) on both sides. To achieve this, A needs to divide and conquer
if its competitor is su¢ ciently strong (in terms of the value of vB1 + v
B
2 ); otherwise, A can
charge both sides.3
Divide/Conquer Side The divide/conquer side of the dominated platform (B) depends
only on the relative size of its own per-interaction benets vB1 and v
B
2 . As explained, the
dominant platform (A) monetizes both sides if B is weak. But whenever A divides and
conquers, observe from Proposition 4 that the divide/conquer side depends only on the
relative size of vA1 and v
A
2 . This di¤ers from that of the subscription model in which the
divide/conquer side of A also depends on vB1 and v
B
2 .
3When vB1 = v
B




2 = 0 by Proposition 4. It is as if A is a





2 and extracts all agentssurplus.
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Optimal Design Given that platforms can rebalance the net per-interaction benets of
the two sides with transaction fees, the optimal design of both platforms is to maximize
the sum of per-interaction benets vm1 +v
m
2 . Unlike the subscription model, all agents now
always coordinate on the platform delivering the higher social surplus (vm1 + v
m
2 )N1N2.
Clearly, the optimal design of platforms now also maximizes social surplus.
Two-Part Tari¤s The analysis is readily extended to two-part tari¤s. Suppose the
respective payo¤s of a side-i agent from joining A and B are




i ) = (v
A
i   pAi )nj   qAi ; uBi (nj ; pBi ; qBi ) = (vBi   pBi )(Nj   nj)  qBi ;
where pmi and q
m
i are respectively the transaction and subscription fees set by platform m













2 )n1n2 + q
A
1 n1 + q
A
2 n2;
and similarly for B. Analogous to the transaction model, agentspayo¤s in this model can
be obtained by replacing vmi and p
m
i in (2.5) with v
m
i   pmi and qmi respectively. Thus,
every subgame of the current model is a weighted potential game, and we can immediately
characterize the potential maximizer.
The following analysis assumes that (i) subscription fees qmi are non-negative as in the
subscription model and (ii) platforms do not use weakly dominated strategies as in the
transaction model. The latter implies pm1 +p
m
2  0 if qm1 = qm2 = 0. As I will prove shortly,
the equilibrium under potential maximization is the same as that of the transaction model,
i.e., characterized by Proposition 4. In other words, when both transaction and subscription
fees are available, only the former are used. Intuitively, transaction fees alleviate the cost
of miscoordination and, therefore, are superior to subscription fees.
Proof. I directly verify that the equilibrium is given by Proposition 4. Assume as in
Proposition 4 that vA1 + v
A











2 ) = (v
B
1   v; vB2   v; 0; 0) and applying the corresponding replacements
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to (2.7), As prot maximization problem is
max
pAi vAi ;qAi 0
(pA1 + p
A
2 )N1N2 + q
A
1 N1 + q
A
2 N2 s.t. (B.3)
vA2   pA2 + v
N2
qA1 +




1   pA1 )(vA2   pA2 )  v2:
I now solve the problem and show that As optimal prices are indeed given by Proposition
4. Observe from the constraint that qA1 ; q
A
2  0 implies (vA1   pA1 )(vA2   pA2 )  v2. First,
xing (pA1 ; p
A




2 ). W.l.o.g., assume v
A
1   pA1  vA2   pA2 . By
Proposition 3 (with the corresponding replacements), we have
qA1 = 0; q
A
2 =
(vA1   pA1 )(vA2   pA2 )  v2
vA1   pA1 + v
N1:
Hence, As problem (B.3) becomes
max




(vA1   pA1 )(vA2   pA2 )  v2
vA1   pA1 + v
N1N2;
(B.4)
which is simplied to
max
pAi vAi ;(vA1  pA1 )(vA2  pA2 )v2;vA1  pA1 vA2  pA2
(vA1   pA1 + v   vA2 )pA1 + vpA2 + vA1 vA2   v2
vA1   pA1 + v
N1N2:
Observe that the prot above is increasing in pA2 . Therefore, A optimally sets the highest
possible pA2 , so that v
A
1   pA1 = vA2   pA2  z. Thus, As problem (B.4) becomes
max
zv









2   z   v)N1N2:






2 ) = (v
A
1   v; vA2   v; 0; 0) as in
Proposition 4. It is easy to see that B has no protable deviation when A sets the above
equilibrium prices. 
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Heterogeneous Agents, Multiple Platforms, Price Discrimination
In this appendix, agents are heterogeneous and may choose among more than two actions.
It is helpful to rst introduce some notation. Let S, S1, and S2 denote the set of all
agents, side-1 agents, and side-2 agents respectively. Clearly, S1 [ S2 = S, S1 \ S2 = ;,
and jSij = Ni. Denote xs 2 Xs as the action of agent s 2 S, x 2 X 
Q
sXs as the action
prole, and x s 2 X s 
Q
t6=sXt as the action prole except xs. Let us(x;p) denote the
payo¤ of agent s with prices p set by platforms in stage 1.
Using the above notation, the model in Section 2.3 is characterized by Xs = fA;Bg for
all s and the payo¤ of agent s from side i = 1; 2 (i.e., s 2 Si) given by
us(A;x s;p) = v
A
i jft 2 Sj : xt = Agj   pAi ; us(B;x s;p) = vBi jft 2 Sj : xt = Bgj   pBi :
Before studying the generalizations, I rst give the general denition of a weighted potential
game for a subgame in stage 2.
Denition 1 A subgame with p set by platforms in stage 1 is a weighted potential game
if there exists a (weight) vector (ws(p))s 2 RjSj+ and a (potential) function p : X ! R
such that for all s 2 S and x s 2 X s,
us(xs;x s;p)  us(x0s;x s;p) = ws(p)[p(xs;x s)  p(x0s;x s)] for all xs; x0s 2 Xs:
Now, consider the rst generalization of the model in Section 2.3 where the payo¤ of













s   pBi ;
where t 2 R++ measures the importance of agent t to agents on the other side, and dms 2 R
is the stand-alone benet/cost of joining platform m for agent s. If all agents have the
same importance s (which can then be normalized to one) as in the previous model, then
they only care about the number (but not the identity) of participants on the other side.
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t)  dBs + pBi
= us(A;x s;p)  us(B;x s;p): 
If each agent derives the same per-interaction benet vs at either platform, then we can
allow each of them to have di¤erent importance ms at di¤erent platforms. Analogously,

































t   dAs + dBs + ~p2)
vs
:
Alternatively, if each side-1 agent has the same importance s and per-interaction ben-
et vs at either platform, then we can allow each side-2 agent to have di¤erent importance
ms and per-interaction benets v
m
s at di¤erent platforms. We can verify that every sub-













































I now further extend the model to M competing platforms given that each agent has
the same importance s and per-interaction benet vs at any platform.4 All platforms
simultaneously set prices (pm1 ; p
m
2 ) 2 R2 in stage 1 (m = 1; : : : ;M), and all agents simul-
taneously decide which platform (if any) to join in stage 2. Each agents action set is now






s   pmi ; us(0;x s;p) = 0:






















2   dms )
vs
:





































4See Tan and Zhou (forthcoming) for a similar model, which also allows for any number of platforms.
They ensure a unique equilibrium by assuming su¢ ciently small network e¤ects relative to the heterogeneity
of agents.
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s   pmi   0 = us(m;x s;p)  us(0;x s;p): 
When there are multiple platforms, some agents may only have access to certain (but
not all) platforms, i.e., Xs  f0; ; : : : ;Mg for each s. Nevertheless, observe from Denition
1 that even if some agentsaction sets Xs are shrunk, every subgame remains a weighted
potential game with the same potential function (now dened on a smaller set of action
proles).
If platforms can charge each agent a di¤erent price pms 2 R, every subgame remains
a weighted potential game with pmi replaced by p
m
s . If they can only partially price dis-
criminate agents, then there are some constraints on their prices pms . When M = 1 and
the platform can perfectly price discriminate agents, the model is a special case of Chans
(2021) multi-agent contracting model, in which the monopoly platform is the principal
who contracts with multiple agents. Proposition 1 of that paper implies that the platforms






t + ds for all s 2 Si (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j),
assuming (for expositional convenience) that the platform wants to attract every agent and
vs
s
6= vtt for all s 2 Si and t 2 Sj .
Same-Side Network E¤ects
The baseline model is generalized such that the payo¤ of a side-i agent from joining the
platform is
ui(ni; nj ; pi) = vinj + fi(ni)  pi;
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where fi : f1; : : : ; Nig ! R measures the same-side network e¤ects on side i. If fi is a
constant function, it reduces to a stand-alone benet/cost of joining the platform. We can
verify that every subgame remains a weighted potential game with the potential function

















If f1 and f2 are positive and increasing, the platform would like to attract all agents. Its
prot maximization problem under potential maximization becomes
max
p1;p20
(p1   c1)N1 + (p2   c2)N2 s.t. (N1; N2) 2 argmaxp(n1; n2): (B.5)
Given that cross-side and same-side network e¤ects are both positive and increasing, there
are only four possible equilibria in stage 2: (i) all agents join the platform, (ii) no one joins
the platform, (iii) only all side-1 agents join the platform, and (iv) only all side-2 agents
join the platform. Given that the potential maximizer is the equilibrium with the highest
potential, (B.5) is simplied as follows:
max
p1;p20

































The solution to this simple linear program is given as follows.














Similar to the baseline model, the platform always divides and conquers. Moreover, the
divide/conquer side does not depend on same-side network e¤ects f1 and f2. Relative to




all agents are better o¤ because the additional benet fi(Ni) each side-i agent derives in
equilibrium is greater than the price markup.
General Temporal Structure
The baseline model is modied as follows. Agents on each side are divided into two groups,
indexed by I and II, and there are N Ii group-I side-i agents and N
II
i group-II side-i agents
(N Ii +N
II





to group-I agents. In stage 2, all group-I agents simultaneously decide whether to join the
platform. In stage 3, the platform sets (pII1 ; p
II
2 ) 2 R2 to group-II agents. In stage 4, all
group-II agents simultaneously decide whether to join the platform. The history of play
is common knowledge, and payo¤s are realized at the end of stage 4. This model reduces
to the baseline model if N I1 = N
I




2 = 0. Note that the analysis can be
easily extended to situations where agents are partitioned into more than two groups.
This model is solved backwards. In stage 3, the numbers of group-I participants nI1 and
nI2 are determined. Hence, for a side-i agent from group II, it is as if there is a stand-alone
benet of vinIj from joining the platform. Thus, the platforms optimal pricing strategy in
stage 3 is given by Proposition 5 in Appendix B with fi() and Ni replaced by vinIj and










In stage 2, all group-I agents anticipate all group-II agents will join the platform
subsequently. Hence, for a side-i agent from group I, it is as if there is a stand-alone
benet of viN IIj from joining the platform. Thus, the platforms optimal pricing strategy









1 ) = v2N1:
All agents join the platform in equilibrium (i.e., nIi = N
I











2 ) + v2N1N2   c1N1   c2N2:
Similar to the baseline model, the platform extracts all side-2 agents surplus when
v1 < v2. It now also extracts some surplus from side 1 because agents face less strategic
uncertainty in the current framework. The surplus extracted from side 1 depends on the
number of agents N Ii and N
II
i in each group. If the platform can freely choose any numbers
of group-I agents (N I1 ; N
I
2 ) 2 f0; : : : ; N1g  f0; : : : ; N2g, it will choose either (N1; 0) or
(0; N2); it extracts all agentssurplus in either case. Suppose instead the platform faces a
constraint: N I1 + N
I
2  n, i.e., it can only approach at most n  minfN1; N2g agents in
advance. The optimal choice is to approach n side-i agents whenever Ni < Nj regardless
of whether vi or vj is larger. Interestingly, the platform makes the same optimal choice if
instead it can only delay n agents and approach them in stage 3.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
Monopolists Optimal Price under Favorable Expectations
I prove for the model in Section 3.3. The example in Section 3.2 is a special case with
v(i; q) = v and (
P
j aj ; q) =
P
j aj   1. Suppose the monopolist wants to attract n  N
consumers. For a xed quality q, the highest possible price it can charge is
p(q) = v(n; q) (n; q) + (n; q);
and only consumers 1 to n will buy the good under favorable expectations. Hence, from
(3.1), its prot is
((1; :::; 1| {z }
n 1s
; 0; :::; 0| {z })
N n 0s
; p(q); q) = n(v(n; q) (n; q) + (n; q))  c(q):
Under B4, this function is increasing in n. Therefore, the monopolist optimally sets the
price p(q) according to (3.8) and attracts all consumers.
Proof of Lemmas 4 and 7
Here, I prove Lemma 7. The proof of Lemma 4 is a special case with v(i; q) = v and
(
P
j aj ; q) =
P
j aj   1. First, I show that the unique equilibrium (and thus the potential
maximizer) is all consumers buying the good when p < (1; q), and no one buying the
good when p > v(N; q)(N; q) + (N; q). When p < (1; q), consumer 1 has a dominant
strategy to buy the good. Given consumer 1s dominant strategy, consumer 2 has an
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(iterated) dominant strategy to buy the good as well because
v(2; q) (2; q) + (2; q) > (1; q) > p; (by B4)
and so on. Therefore, all consumers will buy the good as a dominant-solvable equilib-
rium. By the same token, we can easily verify that the unique (and dominant-solvable)
equilibrium is no one buying the good when p > v(N; q)(N; q) + (N; q).
It remains to identify the potential maximizer when (1; q)  p  v(N; q)(N; q) +
(N; q), in which there are two equilibria. By (3.10), their respective potentials are













; (0; p; q) = 0:
For these subgames, the potential maximizer is all consumers buying the good if and only
if
p  p̂(q) 
P









Last, I show that
(1; q) < p̂(q) < v(N; q)(N; q) + (N; q); (C.1)
and thus p̂(q) is indeed the cuto¤determining which equilibrium is the potential maximizer.
By B4, we have
(1; q) <    < v(i; q)(i; q) + (i; q) <    < v(N; q)(N; q) + (N; q):
This implies for all i 2 f2; : : : ; N   1g,
(1; q)
v(i; q)



























Thus, (C.1) is true. Hence, we have identied the potential maximizer for all subgames,
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and it is summarized by Lemma 7.
Multidimensional Quality and the Generalized Cost Function
This appendix extends the model in Section 3.3 in two aspects. First, the payo¤of consumer
i from buying the good is generalized to
ui(ai = 1;a i; p;q) = v(i;q)  (
X
j
aj ;q) + (i;q)  p;
where q 2 RM+ is the M -dimensional quality of the good. Second, the monopolists payo¤
is generalized to







where the generalized cost function c : f0; : : : ; Ng  RM+ ! R+ increases with the number
of buyers.
B1B4 are naturally modied as follows:




B2. for all i 2 I, v(i;q), (i;q), and (i;q) are increasing and di¤erentiable in q;
B3. for all q 2 RM+ , v(i;q) and (i;q) are decreasing in i;
B4. for all q 2 RM+ , (1;q) = 0, c(1;q)  c(0;q)  (1;q), and v(i;q)(i;q) + (i;q) 
c(i;q) is strictly increasing in i.
B4takes into account the cost function and assumes the marginal cost of production is
small relative to the marginal network benet of additional buyers. Thus, both the social
planner and the monopolist always want to serve all consumers in the subsequent analysis.
I now discuss the analysis of this more general model. For any xed quality prole
q 2 RM+ , the analysis of the monopolists price is almost identical to that of Section 3.3.
The only di¤erence is that we now need to take account of the marginal cost of production,
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which is assumed (in B4) to be relatively small. Thus, the monopolists optimal pricing
strategy is exactly the same as that in Section 3.3 (with q replaced by q).
When determining the socially optimal and equilibrium quality proles, instead of hav-
ing one rst-order condition, there are nowM rst-order conditions, one for each dimension
of the quality. Nevertheless, each rst-order condition takes exactly the same form as that
in Section 3.3 (with c(q) replaced by c(N;q)). Therefore, all insights developed in Section
3.3 carry over to this more general model.
Integer Solutions for the Number of Consumers
Let f(N)  f(N)  f(N   1) denote the (backward) di¤erence of a function f(N). The
socially optimal number of consumers NFB is uniquely given by
c(NFB)| {z }
marginal cost






marginal benets to others




The equilibrium number of consumers N under favorable expectations is uniquely given
by
c(N)  v(N)(N) + (N)| {z }
marginal consumers benet
+(N)(N   1)v(N)| {z }
Spence distortion
+ (N   1)((N   1)v(N) + (N))| {z };
market power distortion
c(N + 1)  v(N + 1)(N + 1) + (N + 1) + (N + 1)Nv(N + 1)
+ N((N)v(N + 1) + (N + 1)):
The equilibrium number of consumers N under unfavorable expectations is uniquely given
by
c(N)  (1)  c(N + 1):
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The equilibrium number of consumers N under potential maximization is more complex,
but we can characterize it in the same way as above, and thus omitted.
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